

# Rebuilding Ground Zero. The Politics of Performance

MAARTEN A. HAJER

*Department of Political Science, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands*

**ABSTRACT** *Some events have such an impact on society that it is unclear whether the standard rules of political decision making still apply. This paper analyses the planning process of rebuilding Ground Zero as a case in which politics was unhinged and new procedures were invented on the spot. The politics of planning was not only about what should be done on the site, but also about the sort of procedure that should be followed to take a legitimate decision. The paper conceives of the political process as a sequence of staged performances and introduces a model that analyses policy processes in terms of discourse, dramaturgy and deliberation. It describes the rebuilding of Ground Zero as a case of an ‘unhappy performance’ in which, as the process continued, the wider publicly-shared determination to create a bold symbolic response to terrorism lost out to uninspired political-economic reasoning. It argues that this analysis of policy processes as performance deserves a much wider application as today’s world is full of situations in which decisions are made in networks marked by unclear rules as to how to arrive at a legitimate decision.*

*Keywords:* Decision making; ground zero; performance; dramaturgy; discourse analysis; deliberation

## Rebuilding Ground Zero

On September 11th 2001 a terrorist attack hit and destroyed the New York World Trade Center and its surroundings. The horrific facts are well known and do not need to be reiterated here. As the initial shock slowly faded, new questions arose: what to do with the site—how should the new symbolic meaning of Ground Zero be dealt with? What is more, how should one, in light of this shattering event, decide on what to do? What sort of planning process could possibly account for the traumatic experience, the ‘moral shock’ that the attack had been for society?

Of course, the rebuilding of Ground Zero approach could be approached as just another planning issue. There were many different interests that were played out in the policy process, and probably those who were most powerful in the end more or less got what they wanted, imposing their ideas, ignoring demands from others. Such an instrumental approach might seem an obvious choice. Yet in another way it is not: 9/11 was a global event, and the images of the collapsing WTC sent waves of moral shock throughout the world. The WTC was not simply a skyscraper; it was targeted as a symbol. Hence what would be done with the site was equally an act of symbolic politics. It seems plausible that the rebuilding of Ground Zero will ultimately also be judged in terms of the way in which

*\*Maarten A. Hajer, Department of Political Science, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237, 1012 DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Email: m.a.hajer@uva.nl*

'America' or even 'the Western world' responded to the challenge of Islamic terrorism. The important question to raise is thus how the process dealt with the unprecedented symbolic complexity of the site.

Before 9/11, the WTC represented, with other markers such as 'Wall Street' and the 'Dow Jones', the unrivalled center of the global economy (Alexander, 2004). Yet how to conceive of the meaning of the site *after* the event? Symbolic inscription started immediately as the site was redefined as 'Ground Zero'. It expressed the broadly shared feelings of many whose lives had been shattered. Yet Ground Zero was also a confusing term.<sup>1</sup> It suggested a need to start from scratch, an annihilation of history. But while the buildings might have been destroyed, the site was not empty; it was full of competing meanings. What these meanings were, how these meanings related to one another, and what significance they had for the process of rebuilding, was, initially, open and ambivalent. Hence this planning process was not simply about building volumes, lay out and programs; behind it was a much more profound negotiation of the symbolic meaning of the site.

In terms of power relations the situation was surprisingly straightforward. The land was owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Property developer Larry Silverstein had signed a 99-year lease over the 10 million square foot WTC just weeks before the event. According to the lease, Silverstein had the right to decide on how to rebuild. Given the fact that Silverstein Properties had to pay on the lease, Silverstein's concern was to rebuild as much office and commercial space on the site as quickly as possible. The Port Authority and Larry Silverstein constituted two very strong actors with a big interest in rebuilding. Indeed, given the legal rights and the ownership of the land, the rebuilding could be expected to be decided between those two major parties.

The politicians in charge, Governor Pataki of New York and Mayor Rudy Giuliani, appreciated that 'planning business as usual' was not a credible option. They set up a special public organization to oversee and control the process of rebuilding the site: the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) in November 2001.<sup>2</sup> Its task was complex: how to deal with strong parties with legal rights and economic incentives to rebuild, a societal need to come up with a symbolically adequate answer to the attack on one of America's prime symbols of success and a political need to devise a process that would satisfy an array of highly sensitive claims to the area? The initial answer seemed most appropriate: the LMDC committed itself to make the redevelopment of Ground Zero into 'an open and participatory' process and promised to organize the planning in such a way that the many sensitivities would be taken into account.

The expression of this commitment to 'an open and participatory' process can be seen as an attempt to *perform a policy process*. Invoking 'performance' is not to suggest politics is 'merely' play. There is a symbolic dimension to state power (Edelman, 1964; Goodsell, 1988). Symbols create meanings and thus may help reproduce power differentials or challenge authority. Yet here they were invoked to deal with a looming conflict and a moral shock. Analytically we have to broaden our horizon: the political process is not merely a matter of interests and/or arguments; politics constantly needs to be *enacted* and a policy process understood as a multiplicity of staged performances (Hariman, 1995; Hilgartner, 2001; Szerszynski *et al.*, 2003).

In the case of Ground Zero, planning was hampered by 'institutional insecurity': there were rules but could they be applied? Was the political meaning of the event not such that it called for a unique, tailor-made institutional approach? Because of the uncertainty, Pataki and Bloomberg needed some space for manoeuvring. With the installation of the LMDC, they essentially 'created' ambivalence about which rules should apply and hence

they opened an arena for contestation in which all sorts of actors could claim the right to have a say. How did this process evolve, and is there a way to evaluate such a planning process?

### **Discourse, Dramaturgy and Deliberation**

To analyse a political process that is highly sensitive, where the stakes are high, where the division of roles is unclear and where there is no authoritative system to quickly differentiate among claims, three dimensions of the policy process can be distinguished: discourse, dramaturgy and deliberation. This finding evolved out of earlier work that paid most attention to the way in which discourses shape up in politics (Hajer, 1995).

#### *Discourse*

In the discourse-analytical tradition, much emphasis is given to the way in which conceptions of reality, but also aspirations and irritations, derive from discursive exchanges. Drawing heavily on the tradition of discursive psychology (e.g. Harré & Gillett, 1994), this approach provides the tools to see how discourses can gain in importance or, indeed, fail to structure politics. Discourse is then understood as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduces in an identifiable set of practices.

The recognition of the importance of language as 'systems of signification' in policy and politics has given rise to a rich and varied literature ranging from narrative analysis to discourse analysis, from the study of the role of metaphor to the study of reframing (e.g. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Roe, 1994; Schön & Rein, 1994; White, 1999; Yanow, 1995). My own discourse-analytical model is meant to illuminate given 'markers', 'structures' and 'patterns' in particular policy discussions.

Ultimately, going back to the original Wittgensteinian idea of 'language game', the work in the 'argumentative' tradition is well aware of the fact that language does not simply 'float' in society but should be related to particular 'practices' in which it is employed (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999). In my own work I sought to link discourse analysis to practices as operational routines and mutually-accepted rules and norms that give coherence to social life and to 'discourse coalitions' as the ensemble of a particular discourse, the actors that employ it and the practices through which a discourse exerts its power. This discourse dimension is summarized in Box 1.

#### *Dramaturgy*

The dramaturgical dimension considers politics as 'performance', as a sequence of staged events in which actors interactively decide on how to move on. Performance is no new notion for social science research. In his *How to Do Things with Words?* (1962) J.L. Austin pointed at the performative dimension of language: to say something can be an act. Exploring the interconnections between the philosophy of language and the social sciences, Austin proposed the term 'performatives' for utterances that imply an action and argued that, in order for speech acts to go well, they must meet certain criteria. These conditions form what Austin called 'happy performatives'.

Interestingly, Austin always assumed a shared repertoire or register of occasions in terms of which an utterance can and is to be understood. Yet often this shared system of meaning cannot be assumed. David Laws (2001) takes the example of a policy conflict

**Box 1.** The discursive dimension of policy analysis*Discourse*

Refers to *markers, structures and patterns* in a discussion

“What if our language does not simply mirror or picture the world but instead profoundly shapes our view of it in the first place?” (Fischer & Forester, 1993, p. 3)

- *Discourse*: an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduces in an identifiable set of practices.
- *Metaphor*: understanding and experiencing a particular thing/event in terms of another
- *Story line*: a condensed sort of narrative that connects different discourses and thus provides the basis of ‘discourse coalitions’
- *Discourse coalition*: the ensemble of particular story lines, the actors that employ them and the practices through which the discourses involved exert their power
- *Practice*: operational routines and mutually accepted rules and norms that give coherence to social life

over waste dumps with participants from different municipalities, with business parties and amenity groups involved. A meeting is called to discuss what action should be taken and by whom. Participants to the meeting will inevitably ask themselves ‘what sort of occasion is this?’ and ‘according to which conventions will this meeting be conducted?’ Yet perhaps an answer to the question cannot be found in the register of political practices known to them. Or, more precisely, different actors most likely will understand the practice in terms of *their own* register. So whereas Austin suggested that speech acts perform by referring back to conventions familiar to us all, Laws suggests that in the unsettling situations of today’s multi-party deliberative ‘governance’, people first need to agree on a provisional sense of what convention(s) are to prevail.

Policy making depends on speech acts in which people intersubjectively negotiate a situation. While the work of Wittgenstein and Austin made clear that a discussion is not merely a matter of talk but is a set of acts as well, the question still is how to analyse the interaction and how to account for the influence of the ‘setting’ in which that interaction takes place.

In discourse analysis, the idea is that discourse and practices ‘co-construct’ participants and their conflicts. Methodologically, the discourse-analytical perspective can be enriched if it is combined with an analysis of the dramaturgical dimension of interaction. Invoking dramaturgical terms such as ‘performativity’ and ‘performance’ actually opens up a dimension to policy analysis that we could not capture with the discourse-analytical tools alone. ‘Performativity’ suggests that language *does* something while performance conveys the understanding that certain meanings constantly have to be reproduced, that signification must be *enacted*, and that this takes place in a particular ‘setting’. Partly this might be a matter of quasi-ritualistic acts, repetition that helps maintain institutions. But while some performances are about replication, others are about improvisation (Waterton 2003), about the way in which an unstable situation can be steadied out. In such situations, policy processes will be ‘staged’ differently, with different ‘scripts’ worked out

**Box 2.** The dramaturgical dimension of policy analysis*Dramaturgy*

Refers to the *physical-symbolical contexture* of a discussion

“Although every act takes place in a setting, we ordinarily take scenes for granted, focusing our attention on actions” (Edelman, 1964).

- *Scripting*: those efforts to create a setting by determining the characters in the play ('Dramatis Personae') and to provide cues for appropriate behaviour;
- *Staging*: the deliberate organization of an interaction, drawing on existing symbols and the invention of new ones, as well as to the distinction between active players and (presumably passive) audiences ('mis en scene');
- *Setting*: the physical situation in which the interaction takes place, including the artifacts that are brought to the situation;
- *Performance*: the way in which *the contextualized interaction* itself produces social realities like understandings of the problem at hand, knowledge, new power-relations.

to achieve a particular result, although in the real-life theatre of politics it always remains to be seen if the performance will be acted out according to the script that the various directors (sic) might have had in mind.

Performance theory explores the ways in which social processes can be understood in dramaturgical terms (Hilgartner, 2001, Schechner, 1988, 1993; Szerszynski *et al.*, 2003). Applying it to policy analysis is to suggest that politics and policy should be regarded as a matter of mutual creation. They should be conceived of as a matter of making something, e.g. through constituting particular working routines or, in some cases, the creation of particular 'communities of (shared) practice' (Wenger 1998).

Today politics and policy are often made in unstable settings. In such cases, performing not only co-determines which rules are followed in the process. It also co-determines which definition of reality is followed, what temporal-spatial frame is seen as 'appropriate', and what constitutes legitimate intervention. This understanding of politics as performance recovers a sense of politics as an artistic endeavour. Politics is an art, and the analysis of politics as performance brings out the skilful way of persuading, the way in which different audiences are 'acted upon', are each approached in an manner appropriate to convincing the group, etc. The analytical tools are summarized in Box 2.

*Deliberation*

Finally, there is the deliberative dimension to policy analysis. Much time has gone by since Wildavsky proclaimed the ideal of a policy science that would 'speak truth to power'. Truth is hardly the self-evident legitimation for expert-led policy making, and (a single agency of) the state hardly counts as the locus of power. In our age of governance networks, power is dispersed and knowledge claims come from various circles. This is not meant to imply that there can no longer be rigorous policy preparation or that the state is always handicapped and disabled. Far from it: there still is an obvious link between policy analysis and democracy. Policy analysis should help produce a fair and balanced process of defining and implementing policies in a variety of domains and allowing for a decision-making process based on the best possible knowledge input.

**Box 3** The deliberative dimension of policy analysis*Deliberation*Refers to the *democratic quality* of a discussion

- *Reciprocity*: discussions must be conducted through an argumentative exchange, hearing both sides, and responding to one another's arguments.
- *Inclusiveness*: debates require that 'stakeholders' are made part of the argumentative exchange, and that everyone with a stake can have his or her say.
- *Openness*: the way in which the debate is staged and conducted must avoid unnecessary barriers, including that of (professional) language.
- *Integrity*: the debate requires honesty and no double play.
- *Accountability*: those involved are accountable to political bodies and to the public at large, also with regards to the degree to which the rules as laid out have been guaranteed.
- *Dialogue*: learning through an iterative process in which knowledge is mobilized and enriched through confrontation with a variety of stakeholders and experts

This paper proposes a threefold operationalization of the long-standing commitment to a policy science of democracy differentiating between process, knowledge and learning. The process dimension can borrow some of the key criteria for a good process from the booming literature on 'deliberative democracy': reciprocity, inclusiveness, openness, integrity and accountability (Bohman, 1996, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996).

The policy science commitment to contribute knowledge to create better decision making here leads to a particular take. If the point of a proper deliberation is to stage a collective exchange that allows people to transform pre-given opinions into new 'preferences' on the basis of the exchange (Benhabib 1996), then it is essential to see how knowledge is approached. In Wildavsky's metaphor, knowledge was still conceived of as a product, something that one could 'deliver' (most probably in terms of a report) to a principal. Deliberative policy analysis suggests this take on knowledge is misguided. Knowledge is a product of practice and it is through an extended engagement that viable, shared and sustainable 'knowledge claims' are produced.

The field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has come up with ample examples of how knowledge production is also a performance (Jasanoff, 1990; Latour, 1987, 1994). Similarly, Doug Torgerson has pointed out that it would be wrong to pit politics as performance against a technocratic approach. It might be tempting, as the objectivist, rigorous, scientist way of conducting policy making seems the antithesis of a performance. Yet as Torgerson points out, the denial of a performative dimension might as well be regarded as a type of performance itself (Torgerson, 2002). 'Cost benefit analysis' with its characteristic 'trust in numbers' (Porter, 1995), the variety of 'impact assessments' and the way they are employed in the policy process, the necessity of reductionism and indeed the creation of 'authoritative data', are particular performances, creating a style of operating which can be analysed as a practice of knowledge production, and which is also a way to try and control an ambivalent situation.

In light of the commitment to facilitate a democratic policy process it is necessary to think of alternative ways of informing the decision-making process. The refutation of a suggested differentiation between the playful performative on the one side and the

objective technocratic on the other leads Torgerson to wonder what differentiation might help understand the difference between the technocratic and the more open process. Reflecting on Bhaktin, Torgerson comes up with the differentiation between the posture of the 'monologue' that is characteristic of a technocratic approach and which can be separated from the 'dialogical' performance. Dialogue fits a deliberative mode and can be integrated in the evaluative scheme. A dialogical model requires a degree of iteration, the attempt to develop plans through taking into account many possible suggestions and critiques. Instead of focusing on knowledge it then makes sense to focus on the adaptive, learning capacities of practices. The deliberative dimension is summarized in Box 3.

### Performing Politics at Ground Zero

In situations of institutional insecurity people tell stories: stories of experience, stories of expertise, stories of governance. Rather than addressing the issue 'what should be done' head on, analytically and in administrative terms, people tend to encircle the question, aiming to contribute to a joint discourse. Narratives have the capacity to be 'read' and understood by different audiences; they can help convey meaning across the boundaries of particular institutional backgrounds. Examining the stories and claims, four underlying discourses can be made out.

#### *Discourse I: The Program*

The Program is a way of reasoning about rebuilding that privileges financial, judicial and commercial arguments. On the 5 October 2001, Silverstein was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying:

I am obligated by my lease to pay rent for 99 years, I am obligated to rebuild, and I have the money to rebuild ... It seems to me I am going to end up rebuilding; the only question is how best to accomplish that.<sup>3</sup>

In July 2002 Mayor Bloomberg argued: "Nobody knows what any building would look like. ... You have to see who wants to rent or buy and when the economy really needs them".<sup>4</sup>

It was a discourse prioritizing feasibility and an assessment of returns as indicated in the argument made by Silverstein in September 2001:

It's more economically feasible to do 50-storey buildings ... Constructing four towers at heights similar to the rest of the Manhattan skyline would avoid creating a new set of terrorist targets as well as erase fears businesses might have of renting space 100 stories up.<sup>5</sup>

In the political arena this discourse would, by itself, not be able to generate the widespread backing that most of those involved deemed necessary. On the other hand, it had the obvious advantage of being very well supported by legal rights and economic power.

#### *Discourse II: Memorial Discourse*

In light of the myriad sensitivities, memorializing quickly became the predominant way to address the central issue of rebuilding Ground Zero. Groups like the Coalition of 9/11 Families, Give Your Voice, and September's Mission, pointed at the fact that Ground Zero was the final resting place of their loved ones.

Treatment of the site must respect the personal grief of all families of victims of 9/11, and the collective pain and shock experienced by the city, state, nation and entire world . . . Structural development at the site should serve the purpose of memorializing the many facets of the events of September 11th for future generations.<sup>6</sup>

John Whitehead, newly appointed as head of the LMDC suggesting that: "We need a very important memorial of some sort, be it a park, a chapel, who knows what it should be. But land must be set aside".<sup>7</sup>

When Larry Silverstein pointed out that he felt obligated to rebuild and had the money to rebuild, he added that 'a memorial' at the site to the victims of the attack "is necessary and totally appropriate".<sup>8</sup>

Memorial discourse captured the need to move very carefully, acknowledging that many other actors had a 'right' to speak on what should happen at the site. But how to accommodate that right with The Program? Stephen Push of The Families of September 11 argued that building commercial buildings in the exact spot where the towers stood would be 'sacrilegious'<sup>9</sup>; many families of victims emphasized the site was a 'sacred, hallowed space' for them. The need for a memorial was widely shared. The Coalition of 9/11 Families had strong ideas: "The site must be treated with all of the reverence due to a hallowed burial ground".<sup>10</sup> But with a remarkable way of relating to, or even redefining The Program: "The site can have a positive impact on the economy of the City through its contribution to tourism and to the cultural and spiritual life of New Yorkers".<sup>10</sup>

Outgoing Mayor Giuliani emphasized in his farewell address that:

I really believe we shouldn't think about this site out there, right behind us, right here, as a site for economic development. We should think about a soaring, monumental, beautiful memorial that just draws millions of people here that just want to see it.<sup>11</sup>

Although remembrance was privileged over economic goals, in fact the need for appropriate commemoration of the dead is combined with the positive economic effects this could have for the area.

At a minimum, 'memorial' came to be a compulsory prefix. The six initial plans presented by the Port Authority and the LMDC in July 2002 were called Memorial Plaza, Memorial Square, Memorial Park, Memorial Promenade, Memorial Triangle and Memorial Garden.<sup>12</sup> But merely paying lip service proved to be not enough: "They all look basically the same", or worse still, "They look like Albany",<sup>13</sup> was a common critique.

What is a good memorial? Leaving the land free? A tower? A chapel? A park? Memorial discourse at some point got its focal point in the idea that the 'footprints' of the two towers of the WTC should fulfill a special role. At a LMDC public hearing, Edith Lutnick, Executive Director of the Cantor Fitzgerald Relief Fund argued:

We polled our families, to see what it was that they wanted, and what they said was they wanted the memorial to be where the people that we loved and lost lived. They would like the memorial to be the footprints of the two buildings and the mall area directly in front of it.<sup>14</sup>

The metaphor of the 'footprints' stuck in the imagination and solidified when Governor Pataki of New York, up for re-election, embraced the idea that nothing should be built in the 'footsteps' of the Twin Towers.<sup>15</sup> Respecting the footprints became the way to pay respect to the families of victims of the event.



*Discourse III: Revitalization*

Once memorialization seemed to resolve the sensitive issue of paying respect to the victims and their families in rebuilding Ground Zero, local groups were in a better position to call attention for their particular stake. These groups, most notably R.Dot (Redevelop Downtown Our Town), argued against a 'Necropolis' and made clear they "didn't want to live next to a cemetery". Moreover, they challenged the claim that the task of redeveloping Ground Zero was to be confined to the 16-acre site. It should be a broader effort to rejuvenate Lower Manhattan, to create a mixed use, and an accessible and vibrant environment. That was the alternative to a maximum capacity office program-cum-memorial.

In February 2002, the *Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York*, a coalition of more than 85 business, community and environmental groups, in partnership with New School University, New York University and Pratt Institute and the Regional Plan Association, argued that:

the best monument honoring those who died at the trade center would be the reconstruction of the area as a beautiful and livable new district of the city and a revitalized center of the regional economy.<sup>16</sup>

This take was reiterated more than once.

At least three discourses competed for dominance in the discursive space: The Program, Memorial and its correction: Revitalization. There was also a growing worry, especially on part of experts such as architects and planners, that the newly emerging consensus would lead to too direct a 'translation' of the deeply felt and widely shared wish to commemorate into cityscapes that fell short of the design possibilities: what was required were "monuments as imaginative as the immensity of the tragedy". But this call on part of designers was quickly followed by the worry of a rival group of experts, urban planners, "that a wrong process would lead to designs leading the program "instead of the program leading the design ..." <sup>17</sup> thus reiterating a familiar professional debate.

*Discourse IV: Phoenix*

A fourth discourse emerged once the Memorial discourse had found its focal point. It called for a symbolic statement that would reflect the capacity to grow stronger, to 'soar'. Cleverly, outgoing mayor Giuliani referred to it in his farewell address:

We have to be able to create something here that enshrines this forever and that allows people to build on it and grow from it. And it's not going to happen if we just think about it in a very narrow way. This place has to become a place in which when anybody comes here immediately they're going to feel the great power and strength and emotion of what it means to be an American.<sup>18</sup>

Initially this Phoenix discourse was expressed in the call to rebuild the Twin Towers (Ed Koch allegedly said "Rebuild them exactly as they were", and a USA Today/CNN poll found 64 per cent in favor of rebuilding<sup>19</sup>). Later on Phoenix discourse grew more subtle. One of its most outspoken protagonists was Paul Goldberger, architecture critic for the *New Yorker*: Like other designers he sought to guide the process away from a mere rebuilding of the office space ('Albany'), into a more daring, more innovative direction.<sup>20</sup>

The thing to do, I am more and more convinced, is to build a great tower - not an office building or an apartment tower, but just a tower, like the Canadian

Broadcasting tower in Toronto, or the Eiffel Tower—that can be an observation tower and a television tower and, most of all, a symbol.<sup>21</sup>

The public similarly called for a restored confidence and pride in a renewed skyline:

Please do not diminish the memory of all of these good people [the victims, MH] by building 50-, 60-, or 70-story mediocre buildings on the site. Please, if you are going to put buildings on that site, build one of the seven modern wonders of the world. And please, give us a skyline that will once again cause our spirits to soar.<sup>22</sup>

So initially the public corrected The Program, and designers helped them to do so. In the meantime planners tended to see the redevelopment process as a change to correct what had gone wrong on the ground or even below the surface. Jonathan Rose of *The Congress for the New Urbanism* thought it

an opportunity to rethink our cities ... Rarely have we had a large site, where people accept density, that has world recognition, at the center of so much transit. It's almost like we have a chance to look at what we did wrong with urban renewal in the 1960s and do it right this time.<sup>23</sup>

Alex Garvin, head planner at the LDMC, suggested: "It is important to think about lower Manhattan as a way to change the entire city of New York ... It's not just another project".<sup>24</sup>

With four discourses leading into different directions and a political commitment to an open process at hand, the question was how to arrive at a widely shared plan for rebuilding.

### Staging a Deliberative Process

In order for discourses to have a political effect, they have to be enacted; they must be part of a speech act. Letters to the editor are enacted utterances, but so are statements in public meetings or corporate decision making. But in the politics of planning the essence is in the take up of a particular idea, the process that transforms and ultimately leads to a particular intervention. Here the LMDC played the central role. Having been criticized almost immediately for its 'business, white and male' bias after its inauguration in November 2001, the LMDC initiated nine advisory boards, with representatives of various stakeholders in January 2002. It also had to position itself vis-à-vis various new associations that had become active, such as the aforementioned Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York and New York/New Visions, a coalition of 21 architecture, planning and design organizations that aimed to improve the quality of the planning process, and the variety of aforementioned stakeholder groups.

In February a first meeting, *Listening to the City*, was organized by the Civic Alliance at which LMDC members could exchange ideas with a range of stakeholders aiming to develop a broader sense of what vision people had for redeveloping Lower Manhattan. This interaction was repeated in May 2002 in a public hearing where again LMDC officials could hear what people had to say. But precisely this format limited its value. The lead programme designer of *AmericaSpeaks* the organization that was hired to moderate the event concurred: "Democracy is not just participation ... It needs to be informed participation. If you don't have the informed side of it, you don't have the core of democracy" (Rosegrant, 2003a, p. 12).

**Table 1.** Chronology of events

November 2001	Mayor Giuliani and Governor Pataki found Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC)
January 2002	Nine advisory councils are added to the LMDC, representing, among others, residents of the WTC area and the families of the victims.
February 2002	'Listening to the city'
May 2002	LMDC hosts its first large public hearing
July 2002	PA and LMDC unveil six designs for the WTC area; start of the campaign for citizen participation. 'Listening to the City II': citizens react very negatively on the presented designs
August 2002	LMDC starts the 'design study'
December 2002	The nine winning designs are presented
January 2003	LMDC organizes public hearings on the designs
February 2003	The Libeskind design is chosen
July 2004	Cornerstone for Freedom Tower is laid
May 2005	Freedom Tower to be significantly redesigned to satisfy new security concerns

In July 2002 the Port Authority and the LMDC unveiled their initial six designs for the site. It was to be the basis for a major new version of *Listening to the City*, a fully scripted and staged event in public participation, organized by the Civic Alliance for the LMDC.

The LMDC had to generate the trust of the public on the one hand, and had to position itself vis-à-vis powerful agencies such as the Port Authority, the City of New York or leaseholder Silverstein. It is intriguing to note that the LMDC and the Port Authority had initially chosen not to clearly demarcate their jurisdictions. In the words of LMDC-president Lou Thomson:

The exact legal relationship of our corporation to the Port Authority has never been precisely defined. One reason we entered into the collaboration agreement with the Port Authority is to avoid questions concerning whether the Port or LMDC has ultimate decision power but roughly, I believe, the Port has ultimate legal authority over the site. And we, in conjunction with the City, have the power off the site.<sup>25</sup>

Given the stakes, this is a remarkable decision that can only be explained by the institutional insecurity that was felt at the time. Here planning was almost literally a sequence of staged performances in which two things had to be settled: (1) what to build at Ground Zero and (2) how to decide.

The LMDC had to draft a script for the process. An effective script defines protagonists and antagonists and has a sequence of scenes through which a plot is played out. Alexander Garvin, planner at the LMDC, argued that the events of September 11 underlined the importance of involving citizens in public policy decisions: "This was an attack on democracy, and we need to demonstrate to the world how a democracy functions... There's no choice here" (Rosegrant, 2003b: p. 3).

Invoking the story line of the 'attack on democracy' was a performative statement as the LMDC had the responsibility to secure a broadly supported plan. By allowing the public in, the relative freedom of the Port Authority and leaseholder Silverstein was confined. At the same time, the script sought to create the terrorists as the antagonist thus implicitly suggesting that the result of the process should be judged in terms of how it effectively pushes back the frightening attacker. Some were quick to point out that the LMDC itself should therefore make way:

we must rebuild as a democracy. It would be a travesty if, in the aftermath of an attack on our democracy, we circumvent our basic democratic procedures.

I therefore call on the Port Authority and the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation to adhere to the city's land use and environmental regulations.<sup>26</sup>

Given the 'open' commitment to an 'open process', people started to probe how open it really was. Congressman Jerrold Nadler, representing Lower Manhattan, argued: "there's currently a great deal of consensus [but only] among the major financial, real estate and government power elite".<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, Paul Goldberger, had argued earlier:

if Mr. Silverstein's four-tower proposal isn't a Disneyland I think it equally ignores the fact that this is now sacred, hallowed land, land on which everybody in New York and everybody in the United States has a vested interest. It cannot be treated as if it belonged to one person.<sup>28</sup>

This amounted to a counter-script in which Silverstein was given the role of the immoral antagonist.

As the powers of the LDMC depended on public support it needed to constantly perform to the script of the rebuilding being an open process. It needed to stage the policy process in such a way that the legitimacy of its decisions would be enhanced. Acting outside the reach of the safety nets of representational democratic organs, it had to script and stage it: it had to perform legitimacy.

If rebuilding Ground Zero was to be an open, participatory process, then the public at large should get the chance to have its say. If this was also to be a deliberative process, then one would also have to make sure that the relevant expertise was mobilized in such a way as to maximize the effectiveness of the joint deliberative process. Here two important performances can be made out:

- *Listening to the City*: a major public meeting, held in the Jacob Javits Center on Saturday, 20 July 2002 to 'shape the future of Lower Manhattan' the outcomes of which contributed to the brief for the 'Design Study';
- *The Design Study*: out of which the choice of the architects emerged and in the context of which designer-experts could present their contributions to the process of rebuilding (August–December 2002) with the public announcement of the result of the design study in February 2003.

### *Listening to the City*

*Listening to the City* was held in the Jacob Javits Center, organized by the Civic Alliance and supported by the LMDC on 20 July 2002, followed by an exhibition at Federal Hall. At the Javits Center some 5000 participants from New York and the tri-state area sought to have their say. The focus of discussion was the six plans that had just been released by the LMDC. Using information technology, opinions of the people were collected on key issues. These were then classified and generated into different development options and on some issues people could vote. Governor Pataki argued that:

The six plans provide a framework within which the various options for the World Trade Center site can be examined. Now it's up to the public to use these plans to generate their own ideas for the site and to play an active role in the redevelopment effort ... The LMDC and the Port Authority have done an excellent job developing this first round of plans and finding innovative ways to involve as many people as possible. (Press release, LMDC and Port Authority, 16 July 2002)

The public was not immediately convinced that they were acting in the heart of an open process. Roland Betts, a member of the LMDC board, tried to reassure the participants, saying: “Everyone seems to fear that the real meeting is going on in some other room. Let me tell you something—this is the real meeting” (Listening to the City; report of the proceedings, p. 3).

The staging of this ‘town meeting’ created a media event that would put the LMDC clearly in the Center. The second part of the Listening to the City outreach was an exhibition at Federal Hall which LMDC president and Executive Director Louis R. Tomson mobilized to show the commitment to the resurrection and democracy:

I can think of no better place to contemplate our nation’s future than the site where the Bill of Rights was adopted and where George Washington pledged to uphold it as the first president. The exhibit continues this tradition by embodying our nation’s most important guiding principle: democracy. By expressing their opinions and suggestions at the exhibit, the public will play an integral role in the rebuilding and redevelopment process. (Press release, LMDC, 23 July 2002)

This was actually taken up by Port Authority Executive Director Joseph J. Seymour who added:

Before it came the first home of the continental Congress, Federal Hall was the site of New York City’s first city hall. New York and the United States really started here. How fitting that Federal Hall should once again be the site where New Yorkers and people from all over the region, can come to let their voices be heard, as we try to build a consensus on the plans for Lower Manhattan’s rebirth. (Press release, LMDC, 23 July 2002)

Whatever the role of Listening to the City in the script might have been, the performance was ‘unhappy’ for the key actors as on 14 August 2002 the LMDC announced that the six designs were rejected and new designs were to be developed. In terms of performing an open and transparent participatory process, Listening to the City should, despite all possible criticisms, be regarded a success. Mediating a meeting with more than 5000 people in the giant Javits Center was the sort of dramatic staging that was needed to show the commitment to involving the public. Canceling the six designs showed that the public was listened to.

### *The Design Study*

A ‘design competition’ is a standard practice in planning. Usually, the winning design is then built. In this case, the idea was to generate ideas that could then be ‘input’ in a further process involving other actors. The ‘design study’ was to allow up to five selected architects to develop “new flexible program alternatives shaped by public input”. The press release of 14 August stated the provision that:

LMDC/Port Authority planning staff and consultants, including Beyer Blinder Belle and Peterson Littenberg, *will continue to explore* varied approaches to the World Trade Center site based on the new program alternatives. [emphasis added] (Press release, LMDC, 14 August 2002)

If the script of LMDC was to make this an open and participative process, this provision was a serious threat to live up to (self-imposed) expectations. The ‘design study’ connected the LMDC to another key stakeholder, New York / New Visions, a coalition of

21 architecture, planning and design firms that was brought in to help draw up the criteria and select the winner of the design study. On 26 September 2002, nine designs were selected out of a pool of more than 400 contributions. In December 2002 the designs were presented.

At this point the LMDC seems to have lost control over the process as key participants started to doubt the strength of the 'official' process. Other stages emerged as the Civic Alliance held its own workshops for planners to come up with good plans and Imagine New York staged alternative community workshops. As an indicator that the script did not work on 12 December 2002, just days before the announcement of the winning design from the design study, Mayor Bloomberg of New York took up a role as alternative director setting the stage in his terms:

Next week, the LMDC will make public seven proposals for the future of the World Trade Center site—this is the product of months of work by some of the best design teams in the world. What you will see will be very different from the six site plans that were presented last summer. Some of these new designs make eloquent statements about what happened on 9/11; they truly are capable of instructing and inspiring future generations. Some speak of hope—and renewal—more powerfully than any words can. Some boldly restore the skyline—in ways that say, in no uncertain terms, this is New York—and the terrorists didn't win.

Some do all three. . . .

But no matter how magnificent the best designs for the 16 acres of the World Trade Center site prove to be, it must be complemented by an equally bold vision for all of Lower Manhattan—a New Beginning for Lower Manhattan—that meets the needs of all of New Yorkers . . . and of the entire region. . . . We have underinvested in Lower Manhattan for decades. . . . The time has come—to put an end to that, to restore Lower Manhattan to its rightful place as a global center of innovation—and make it a "Downtown for the 21st Century".<sup>29</sup>

Bloomberg's speech inadvertently shows how he had fallen victim to the previous administration's institutional decision to create an independent LMDC at arm's length of the established City Council. Realizing the bureaucratic power of the Port Authority, he sought to stage the public as a key player to influence decision making in his own city.<sup>30</sup>

On 18 December 2002, the results of the design study were presented. The stage was captured by Daniel Libeskind, who, like few other architects, mastered the art of employing story lines as performatives. While the business coalition had just continued with the preparations for *The Program*, and had in the meantime forced Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) into the design study, this was the moment at which any alternative had to present itself were it to stand any chance. SOM presented itself discursively as in an almost default 'client-architect' exchange in which Silverstein, the leaseholder, was the undisputed client, as did Norman Forster, probably the most experienced architect of buildings of this scale. However, THINK and Libeskind presented to the public, indeed *created* the broader public as client, and tried to offer solutions to public problems. They picked up on a range of sensibilities that had emerged out of the public outreach meetings staged by the LMDC in the months before, as Libeskind's presentation makes clear:

I arrived by ship to New York as a teenager, an immigrant, and like millions of others before me, my first sight was the Statue of Liberty and the amazing skyline of Manhattan. I have never forgotten that sight or what it stands for. This is what this project is all about.

When I first began this project, New Yorkers were divided as to whether to keep the site of the World Trade Center empty or to fill the site completely and build upon it. I meditated many days on this seemingly impossible dichotomy. To acknowledge the terrible deaths which occurred on this site, while looking to the future with hope, seemed like two moments which could not be joined. I sought to find a solution which would bring these seemingly contradictory viewpoints into an unexpected unity. So, I went to look at the site, to stand within it, to see people walking around it, to feel its power and to listen to its voices. And this is what I heard, felt and saw.

... The exciting architecture of the new Lower Manhattan rail station with a concourse linking the PATH trains, the subways connected, hotels, a performing arts center, office towers, underground malls, street level shops, restaurants, cafes; create a dense and exhilarating affirmation of New York.

The sky will be home again to a towering spire of 1776 feet high, the "Gardens of the World". Why gardens? Because gardens are a constant affirmation of life. A skyscraper rises above its predecessors, reasserting the pre-eminence of freedom and beauty, restoring the spiritual peak to the city, creating an icon that speaks of our vitality in the face of danger and our optimism in the aftermath of tragedy.

Life victorious. (see Figure 1).

Libeskind communicated with a personalized ("I arrived", "I went back to the site"), emotional (amazement, death, hope, vitality, life victorious) narrative.<sup>31</sup> Both Libeskind and THINK had engaged in more outreach during the actual design study: both had sought to develop an exchange with a range of public groups. Second, Libeskind showed himself well aware that this was a mediated event, and that the media were a decision-making stage in their own right. Himself staged by his PR-consultant, he was live on the *Oprah Winfrey Show*, was interviewed in the *New York Times* in his cowboy boots and his glasses and in *Rolling Stone* to discuss his five 'coolest' things in the critical months of discourse formation and decision making.<sup>32</sup> Libeskind turned into a public figure and conquered a central role at the cost of such first-class designers as Norman Forster who literally had no answer to the multi-stage performance.

### *Deciding on the Design*

In the process two distinct discourse-coalitions emerged, one centering essentially on the Program, with Silverstein, the Port Authority and SOM; another aiming at a broader public design with components from the discourses of Phoenix and Rebuilding catering for the variety of interests, with a clear role for Civic Alliance, New York/New Visions, the planners from the LMDC and in which both THINK and Libeskind located their designs. Whereas the first discourse-coalition was well grounded in legal and economical practices and operated behind the scenes, the second discourse-coalition typically depended on public performances and outreach.



Figure 1 . The Libeskind design: skyline and framing© studio Daniel Libeskind

Still it was unclear how to move on. Not surprisingly the Civic Alliance called for a new major public meeting. The board of LMDC argued against it and reiterated on 9 January 2003 that this was NOT a design competition: the design study was to contribute to finding ‘innovative designs’.<sup>33</sup> In January the LMDC organized ‘public hearings’ but whereas the ambiguous and obviously heavily staged Listening to the City created possibilities for participation, this traditional format only aroused irritation and disappointment. There is evidence that no one knew exactly which stage(s) were relevant for the ultimate decision making; even leaseholder Silverstein went public and sent a long open letter to John Whitehead as Head of the LMDC with off-prints to all rebuilding officials of importance underling the need to be realistic and to rebuild as much space as possible. Arguably most insightful were his closing remarks quoted here:

... we certainly do not maintain that our group has the unfettered right to build whatever we desire ... But we must find a way to make sure that all responsible parties come to agreement on a plan that will be architecturally spectacular, will meet the demands of the tenants that we must bring back to lower Manhattan and, most importantly, will assure the safety of the occupants of the buildings and assure them a fast, safe and efficient egress in the event of an emergency.<sup>34</sup>

Actors that allegedly were in control, spoke out in public in ways that suggest that they attempted to *gain* or *keep* control: apart from Mayor Bloomberg on 12 December, there were public statements from Betts (LMDC) on 10 December, Tomson (LMDC) on 18 December, and, probably most significantly, Silverstein on 31 January 2003. The letter by Silverstein indicates that the LMDC had tried to impose on Silverstein the claim that Libeskind should be given a powerful role as master planner, while Silverstein, who had until then put his cards on Beyer, Blinder & Belle as chosen builders and on SOM (David Childs) as



architects, thought it necessary to publicly reiterate that there was a clear difference between a master plan and a built project.

The vague commitments to 'openness' and participation that initially accompanied the LMDC's declarations vis-à-vis the decision making process, and the emphasis on this being a collaborative effort, including private and public parties, in the end generated unease on the part of all parties, with what we might call the 'demarcation statements' of top players (Bloomberg in December, Silverstein in January) as the result.

On the 4 February 2003 the LMDC announced Libeskind and THINK as finalists but by now the lack of a clear and well-organized decision-making process even made key actors nervous.

"The rebuilding process has become so convoluted that it's difficult to know what to make of the selection of the two design teams", said Robert Yaro, president of the Regional Plan Association and chairman of the Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown. "Both teams clearly represent some of the world's most talented architects, but it's not apparent what they'll be asked to do or what impact they'll have on the final master plan. What we need is a clear decision-making process that incorporates public input every step of the way", he continued. "Now, it's impossible to tell who is making the decisions or what the process is for the next six days, not to mention the next six weeks or years".<sup>35</sup>

On the 27 February 2003, the LMDC chose the design by Daniel Libeskind for the site of Ground Zero, a decision that was worldwide reported as a victory for Libeskind. But later the differentiation between 'master planner' and 'project architect' was reinforced with David Childs as suggested architect of (Silverstein's) Freedom Tower while Libeskind should be seen as responsible for the urban lay out. On the 4 July 2004, the cornerstone for the Freedom Tower was laid. Larry Silverstein commented that: "... the Freedom Tower will forever stand as a testament to our resilience, our resolve and our glorious rebirth. ... Now, we build".<sup>36</sup> Alas, in May 2005 new security concerns necessitated new redesigns, sending Childs and Libeskind 'back to the wrestling mat' (New York Times, 7 May 2005). It is still unclear what the rebuilding of Ground Zero will look like.

## **Conclusion**

Rebuilding Ground Zero was never going to be an easy planning process. The analysis illuminates the complexity of both the production of meaning as well as the dramaturgical dynamics of the process. The discourse analysis showed that stories fulfill a central role in cases in which planning is to take place following moral shock. Planning was not based on facts-as-information but on facts-as-experience presented in accounts, through metaphors and with all the ambiguities and amplifications that come with story-telling. Some metaphors stuck, like the 'footprints' that catered for being respectful in redesigning the site. Some stories performed politics; some soothed, while others created tensions, disappointment and anger. The remarkable way in which Daniel Libeskind, who had never designed let alone built a skyscraper in his career, captured the process shows how an open process allows participants to mobilize other, unanticipated power resources. Libeskind made the process into a broad, multi-stage affair. Yet once the decision was taken, he lost his public power base and quickly also lost his central role in the overall design of the site.

The high economic stakes, the moral obligation to respect the families of victims, as well as the need to find a symbolic reply to the terrorist attack of 9/11 made it difficult to find a

consensus on a new plan from the start. In the event, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation was created to oversee the process. After an initially bad start they sought to win public confidence by committing themselves to an open, participatory process. In many regards, this became an 'unhappy' performative as the LMDC was unable to extend this deliberative process beyond the initial outreach. Surely, the *Listening to the City* meetings were an achievement in themselves but could only have been a starting point of a deliberative design. The Design Study was an improvised follow-up that was in many ways much more interesting. Whereas the *Listening to the City* hardly allowed for development of 'opinions' into 'preferences' (Benhabib, 1996), the Design Study saw (some of the) experts collaborate with various citizen groups and other stakeholders. One quality of a deliberative design surely must be that (design) professionals collaborate over a period of time with stakeholders, thus allowing the design to be strengthened by public input. But there was no creative follow-up, allowing the public to advise, for example, on the various designs, or to assess what qualities the different designs had for the site. The public hearings of January 2003 misperformed: they did not allow for an assessment in terms of the discourses that had been built up over the course of the planning process.

In terms of dramaturgy, the planning process was conducted on multiple stages. Despite the elaborate techniques involved in *Listening to the City* and despite the creativity of the *Design Study*, the process lacked a clearly scripted transitional ritual through which the negative emotion of 9/11 could be transformed into the positive emotion of the idea of a resurrection, a phoenix. More importantly, the process failed to dramaturgically deliver on its promise to be a democratic answer to the terrorist attack. Since the choice for Libeskind, the process has stumbled from one incident to the next, while the boldness of the designs is ground in the mill of various extra demands (office space, relocation, security). The fact that key protagonists initially constantly invoked the terms of democracy and participatory process of course contributed to the unhappy performative. The political decision to create the LMDC created a new stage for decision making. But through the absence of a well designed follow-up on the outreach and participatory moments, it suggested that participation and democracy were at best conceived of in terms of exchanging ideas but not as public deliberation, decision making and public accountability.

### Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank his research assistants Chantal Laurent and Wytse Versteeg for their preparatory work and Archon Fung, Patsy Healey, Dvora Yanow as well as the reviewers for their comments on the earlier draft of this paper.

### Notes

1. The term 'Ground Zero' was not 'blank', as it picked up on previous meaning of 'Ground Zero' as a reference to the Trinity Site, the place where the first nuclear bombs had been detonated in 1945.
2. Allegedly, the creation of the LDMC was also a safeguard to make sure that Democratic candidate Mark Green, the then assumed successor to Rudy Giuliani as Mayor of New York, could not get control over the rebuilding process.
3. <http://www.greatgridlock.net/NYC/nycpress.html#moses>
4. 20 July 2002. <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/16/wtc.site.plans/>
5. 21 September 2001. <http://www.newsday.com/ny-bzsil212376349sep21,0,1298731.story>
6. <http://www.giveyourvoice.com/lobby.html>
7. On 30 November 2001. <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Pantheon/4761/rebuildingplans.html>

8. 21 September 2001 <http://www.newsday.com/ny-bzsil212376349sep21,0,1298731.story>
9. <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Pantheon/4761/rebuildingplans.html>
10. <http://www.giveyourvoice.com/lobby.html>
11. On 28 December 2001. <http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter/Headlines/AR/20020103t.asp>
12. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/sixplans/index.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/sixplans/index.shtml)
13. <http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/sixplans/>
14. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/features/public\\_hearing\\_one/victims\\_families/lutnick.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/features/public_hearing_one/victims_families/lutnick.shtml)
15. <http://www.gothamgazette.com/elections/91102.shtml>
16. 11 February 2002. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/911\\_sixmonths/printable.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/911_sixmonths/printable.shtml)
17. [http://www.coi.columbia.edu/pdf/girard\\_polletta\\_stark\\_pmp.pdf](http://www.coi.columbia.edu/pdf/girard_polletta_stark_pmp.pdf)
18. <http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter/Headlines/AR/20020103t.asp>
19. <http://justinberzon.com/BRText.htm>
20. cf. also Goldberger's keynote address at the Regional Planning Association, 26 April 2002. <http://www.rpa.org/pdf/ra2002-goldberger.pdf>
21. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/topics/rebuild\\_downtown/goldberger.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/topics/rebuild_downtown/goldberger.shtml)
22. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/features/public\\_hearing\\_one/build\\_high/excerpts.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/features/public_hearing_one/build_high/excerpts.shtml)
23. 11 March 2002. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/911\\_sixmonths/printable.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/911_sixmonths/printable.shtml)
24. Alex Marvin, 10 June 2002. <http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/rebuildingdowntown/index.shtml>
25. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/chat/tomsontranscript.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/chat/tomsontranscript.shtml), chat on 24 July 2002.
26. Alan Gerson, City Council Representative, District 1 at LMDC first public hearing, 23 May 2002. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/features/public\\_hearing\\_one/gerson.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/features/public_hearing_one/gerson.shtml)
27. Quoted in Mark Berkey-Gerard, Rebuilding By Consensus? 10 June 2002, <http://www.gothamgazette.com/iotw/rebuildingdowntown/index.shtml>
28. [http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding\\_nyc/topics/rebuild\\_downtown/goldberger.shtml](http://www.gothamgazette.com/rebuilding_nyc/topics/rebuild_downtown/goldberger.shtml)
29. <http://www.lowermanhattan.info/rebuild/vision.asp>.
30. The speech also was a statement of *planning* in which the 'true' challenge was defined to be the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan and the key 'variables' were new high quality transport links. The costs of his plans added up to an estimated \$10.6 billion, \$8.8 billion of which would go into the infrastructure.
31. For full presentations of all plans, cf. [http://www.renewnyc.com/plan\\_des\\_dev/wtc\\_site/new\\_design\\_plans/](http://www.renewnyc.com/plan_des_dev/wtc_site/new_design_plans/)
32. For an analysis cf. Gillmore, D. 'The crystal method', *The Walrus Magazine*, February/March 2004.
33. 9 January 2003, <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030127&c=2&s=nobel>
34. 31 January 2003. Full transcript available at <http://reconstructionreport.org/article.pl?sid=03/02/03/2052224>; also cf. <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/story/56367p-52778c.html>
35. *NY Observer*, 10 February 2003, <http://reconstructionreport.org/article.pl?sid=03/02/06/1952200>
36. <http://www.renewnyc.com/News>.

## References

- Alexander, J.C. (2004) From the depths of despair: performance and counterperformance on September 11th, *Sociological Theory*, 21(1), pp. 88–105.
- Austin, J.L. (1962) *How to Do Things with Words?* (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
- Benhabib, S. (Ed.) (1996) *Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
- Bohman, J. (1996) *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).
- Bohman, J. (1997) *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).
- Edelman, M. (1964) *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Chicago, University of Illinois Press).
- Fischer, F. & Forester, J. (Eds) (1993) *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* (Durham, Duke University Press).
- Forester, J. (1999) *The Deliberative Practitioner. Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes* (Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press).
- Gillmore, D. (2004) The Crystal Method, *The Walrus*, February/March, pp. 56–65.
- Goldberger, P. (2004) *Up from Zero—Politics, Architecture and the Rebuilding of Ground* (New York, Random House).
- Goodsell, C.T. (1988) *The Social Meaning of Civic Space: Studying Political Authority Through Architecture* (Kansas, University Press of Kansas).
- Gutmann, A. & Thompson, D. (1996) *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press).

- Hajer, M.A. (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Hajer, M.A. & Wagenaar, H. (Eds) (2003) *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- Hariman, R. (1995) *Political Style—The Artistry of Power* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
- Harré, R. & Gillett, G. (1994) *The Discursive Mind* (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage).
- Hilgartner, S. (2001) *Science on Stage* (Stanford, Stanford University Press).
- Jasanoff, S. (1990) *The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers and Policy Makers* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
- Latour, B. (1987) *Science in Action* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
- Latour, B. (1994) *Pasteur: une science, un style, un siècle* (Paris, Perrin).
- Laws, D. (2001) Enacting deliberation: speech and the micro-foundations of deliberative democracy. Paper presented at the EPCR Joint Sessions, Grenoble, Workshop 9.
- Porter, T.M. (1995) *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
- Roe, E. (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice* (Durham, Duke University Press).
- Rosegrant, S. (2003) *Listening to the City: Rebuilding at New York's World Trade Center Site*, Case Studies in Public Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Schechner, R. (1988) *Performance Theory* (New York, Routledge).
- Schechner, R. (1993) *The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance* (London, Routledge).
- Schön, D.A. & Rein, M. (1994) *Frame Reflection. Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies* (New York, Basic Books).
- Szerszynski, B., Heim, W. & Waterton, C. (2003) *Nature Performed—Environment, Culture and Performance* (Oxford, Blackwell).
- Torgerson, D. (2002) Policy as performance. Paper presented at the Workshop on changing forms of governance and deliberative democracy, Conference of the Netherlands Institute of Government, Rotterdam, October.
- Waterton, C. (2003) Performing the classification of nature, in: B. Szerszynski, W. Heim & C. Waterton (Eds) *Nature Performed—Environment, Culture and Performance*, pp. 111–129 (Oxford, Blackwell).
- Wenger, E. (1998) *Communities of Practice. Learning, Meaning, and Identity* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- White, J.D. (1999) *Taking Language Seriously. The Narrative Foundations of Public Administration Research* (Washington DC, Georgetown University Press).
- Williams, R. (1981) *Culture* (London, Fontana).
- Yanow, D. (1995) Practices of policy interpretation, *Policy Sciences*, 28(2), pp. 111–126.