Editors’ Introduction

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Governance or the Rise of a new Vocabulary

One of the most striking developments in the analysis of politics and policymaking is the shift in vocabulary that has occurred over the last ten years. Terms like ‘governance’, ‘institutional capacity’, ‘networks’, ‘complexity’, ‘trust’, ‘deliberation’ and ‘interdependence’ dominate the debate, while terms like ‘the state’, ‘government’, ‘power’ and ‘authority’, ‘loyalty’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘participation’ and ‘interest groups’ have lost their grip on the analytical imagination. The new vocabulary prevails in spheres ranging from international relations (Rosenau 1995; Finkelstein 1995, Worldbank 1997) to policy analysis and public administration (Rhodes 1996, Rhodes 2000), from comparative politics to urban planning (Healey 1997, Innes & Booher 1999b, Forester 1999), from European studies (Marks 1996) to political theory (Dryzek 2000, March & Olsen 1995). The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, is widely proclaimed and endorsed in the political science and policy science communities (for an analytical overview, see especially Pierre 2000). Social science is no less immune to fads than popular culture. New concepts often have a remarkably short shelf life. New vocabularies may signify no more than a change of rhetoric. In this case this explanation is too simple. The new vocabulary seems to capture changes in both the nature and topography of politics. A new range of political practices has emerged in-between institutional layers of the state and between state institutions and societal organizations. The new language is rooted in an appreciation of the importance of these new political practices.
Authors as varied as James Rosenau, Judith Innes and John Dryzek have pointed out that it is these often transient and informal arrangements that produce solutions; not conventions among states, directives, or authoritative decisions. Examples offer themselves readily. In California ‘collaborative dialogues’ have produced workable solutions to persistent problems in water management, a sensitive issue that state institutions have long sought to regulate (Innes & Booher, this volume). The importance of informal policy networks in the European Union is increasingly appreciated. Specialists have characterized the EU as ‘an experiment in finding alternative forms for developing public policy’ (Wallace 1997:16). The success of these networks of public administrators, scientists, experts and NGOs in resisting the pressure to become part of the formal policymaking structures and the contribution of non-governmental actors to reducing the much discussed ‘implementation deficit’ are now acknowledged, even if reluctantly (Jordan 1999, Knill 2000). In international politics the Arctic Council brings together eight national governments to discuss common environmental problems. Representatives from ‘First Nations’ (Inuit, other Native American and Sami communities), scientific experts and policy advisors from international organizations play prominent roles in the discourse (Tennberg 1998, Young & Osherenko 1993). CITES arrangements on the protection of wild animals rely heavily on the work of non-state actors.

The emerging vocabulary of governance speaks to a widely acknowledged change in the nature of politics and policymaking. The prominence of the new vocabulary also illustrates a widespread dissatisfaction with the limited reach of ‘set solutions’ to thorny political issues imposed through top-down government intervention. One of the virtues of the vocabulary of ‘governance’ is the way it opens up the cognitive commitments implicit in the thinking about governing and political decision-making. The language of ‘governance’ seems to help practitioners and theorists alike to unlearn embedded intellectual reflexes and break out of tacit patterns of thinking. This stimulates them to rethink governing, politics, and administration against the backdrop of these changing societal processes. Thinking about institutional design nowadays requires sociological input.

Many pressing problems no longer comport with the established systems of politics, administration, and society. Practical needs drive the development of cooperative efforts among new constellations of actors. Organizations themselves have become aware of how much more fluid their boundaries are. The demands of business highlight interdependencies and relationships among tasks and prompt the development of inter-organizational networks.
Governments also see the tie between interaction, cooperation, and results. The consequences of these new inter-organizational activities do not stop with how politics is conducted. They reshape what politics and policymaking is about. We live in an age of ‘constitutional politics’ (Ackerman 1992) in which constitutive rules are increasingly the object of politics. Collaborative Dialogues in California, the role of the variety of Committees in the European Union, and the Artic Council all suggest that politics is not ‘simply’ concerned with outcomes (Ackermann’s ‘normal’ politics); we quarrel about the rules of the game themselves.

The rise of a vocabulary of governance indicates a shift away from well-established notions of politics and brings in new sites, new actors, and new themes. There is a move from the familiar topography of formal political institutions to the edges of organizational activity, negotiations between sovereign bodies, and inter-organizational networks that gut more than span comfortable distinctions between public and private. The disparate actors who populate these networks find nascent points of solidarity in the joint realization that they need one another to craft effective political agreements. Their efforts to find solutions acceptable to all who are involved (and to expand the circle of involvement) nibbles and gnaws on the constitutional system of territorially based representative democracy. Notions of politics itself change as new themes occupy center stage. It is probably no coincidence that these practices are more developed in ‘new’ spheres of politics like the environment and the ‘life politics’ of food and technology.

We witness the creation of a secondary reality of political practice, in the terminology of Mark Warren of “expansive democracy” (Warren 1992), juxtaposed with standard liberal democracy. Expansive democracy is characterized by increased participation, either by means of small-scale direct democracy or through strong linkages between citizens and broad-scale institutions, by pushing democracy beyond traditional political spheres, and by relating decision-making to the persons who are affected. Democracy has intrinsic value for those who engage in deliberative processes, value that is tied to an immanent potential for transformation and the development of capacities for citizenship that enable individuals and groups to respond directly and effectively to uncertainty and social conflict (Warren 1992: 9). This does not imply that ‘classical-modernist’ institutions, characterized and maintained by codified, well-established patterns of behavior, simply fade away. Clearly, much of the business of governing is still effected by the traditional hierarchical institutions of government. However, they must now increasingly compete with open-ended, often unusual, ad hoc arrangements.
that demonstrate remarkable problem-solving capacity and open opportunities for learning and change in exactly those circumstances where classical-modernist institutions have failed to produce.

These trends shift the debate about democracy from the normative to the empirical. This does not absolve analysts from confronting the standard objections towards direct democracy leveled by adherents of representative, Madisonian forms of democratic government (deLeon 1997, Warren 1992), but at least these objections can now be addressed on empirical grounds. What these developments show is that expansive democracy has moved from an alluring ideal to a budding reality in many regions, countries, and policy domains. The new vocabulary of governance rides the back of new political strategies of cooperation that play out at the margins of traditional classical-modernist political institutions. The conceptual rhythm of these efforts pares political reality in new meters and themes.

The need for an interpretative account of governance

Many analysts and commentators seem to suggest that the new vocabulary is the logical answer to a changing world. ‘Governance’ and ‘network management’ emerge as response to the new reality of a ‘network society’ in which we live. The conceptual shift is legitimized as a necessary adjustment, and a habitual quick reference to Castells (Castells 1996) is mostly seen to suffice to indicate what sort of processes of social change we should have in mind when rethinking politics and policymaking.

Involvement tends to induce myopia, but it is probably safe to say that we are going through a phase of radical social change. At the same time there is something profoundly disturbing about the change of vocabulary and the rush into a restyling of the practices of government that accompanies the new vocabulary. First, the new commitments to governance are often not based on a rigorous analysis of what it exactly is that is ‘new’ about our reality. There is a widespread tendency among analysts to describe the changing reality in terms of key macro-sociological processes. Technological developments (information technologies in particular), globalization, individualization and emancipation are called upon to explain the erosion of the power of the state and politics in general. Yet it might also be seen as an academically legitimated ‘mantra’ emphasizing various centrifugal tendencies in society without really showing the mechanisms at work. The relationship between macro-sociological change and the
crisis of government is often more asserted than argued. To be sure, we would agree that the themes discussed under the headings of the ‘network society’, the ‘risk society’, or ‘reflexive modernization’ have grave repercussions for the character of governance, yet the field is remarkable short on empirical investigations which draw on that literature to see new manifestations of governance in the network society (Beck 1999). It remains unclear how the changes and transformations that are summarized by the term network society exactly challenge the activity and effectiveness of policymaking and politics. How are technological developments related to the introduction of new practices of governing for instance, which development causes what? What can we expect from a ‘subpolitics’ ‘outside and beyond’ the representative institutions of politics? What is the effect of the widespread usage of managerial language and practices in the new systems of governance, and how does this relate to the processes of macro-sociological change?

Concluding the first volume of his inquiries into the information age, Manuel Castells states: “Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of network logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture.” (Castells 1996:468) In a certain sense this is of course a truism as any social formation can be conceived of as a network. The more profound idea is, however, that we can discern shift in networks: new networks eroding the power of previously powerful ones. Moreover, there is the instability of networks; the awareness that society experiences a ‘new modernity’ (Beck) in which established institutions might prove less stable and solid than we assumed and are less well positioned to keep risks at bay. Society should be conceived off as made up of open or unstable structures that expand, readjust, shift and evaporate; that create new chances but new risks too, of practices that mobilize on some problems, leaving others aside.

In this context the abstract language of Castells makes sense. What the rise of the vocabulary of governance makes clear is that we experience a shift in language from institutions to networks. Whereas the institutional language implies stability, networks imply fluidity. What comes out in Castells’ work is that the presence or absence in particular networks, combined with the inherent dynamics of each of these networks now becomes a critical source of power (1996:468). However, even this can be seen as a rather superficial statement. We need to know much more about the character of this dynamics. As R.A.W. Rhodes argued, the emergence of networks is not the end of state authority per se but the redefinition of it, characterized by a much more open mind allowing for much more diversity and
experimentation (Rhodes 2000:55; cf. also Heritier 1993, Kickert et al. 1997). Likewise, in this context issues of power and interest are not simply rendered meaningless but are redefined and relocated. Hence to take networks and governance seriously by no means implies endorsing a quasi Thatcherite ‘rolling back of the state’. Rather what we want to do is analyze the tensions and conflicts generated by the impact of the newer ‘networked’ forms of policy-making and political mobilization, and also examine the potential of these new practices for a search for more democratic governance. After all, as Torgerson points out, there is hardly a reason to idealize classical bureaucracies in this regard (this volume). Endorsing this view our task is to trace telling experiments with governance and to conceptualize the new settings in which politics and policymaking take place as well as the way in which this changes the character of the political game.

We aim to readjust this relationship between social theory and the inquiries into policymaking and politics. Rather then suggesting that these should be about the impact of the network society on policymaking and politics, our suggestion would be that we should focus on concrete manifestations of policymaking and politics in the era of the network society. In the former tradition we would try to explain various occurrences in politics drawing on macrosociological insights. However, if we focus, empirically, on the manifestations of policymaking and politics in the network society, we would analyze such issues as the way in which different actors nowadays conceive of politics, which actors participate, what they see as effective political action, how actors frame conflict, and to what extent the classical-modernist institutions indeed hamper finding effective solutions to problems people want to see resolved. The idea here clearly is not to simply ‘promote’ governance as an alternative approach. Likewise, the search is not for the general laws, or the ‘essence’ of governing in the network society. Right now we aim to focus on the variety of ways in which governing occurs. We thus try to grasp analytically what this means for our understanding of politics and policymaking, of the relationship between state and society, of our possibilities of collective learning and conflict resolution, and of the nature and role of policy analysis in all this.

This book is an attempt to do just that. We draw on the tradition of interpretative analysis of policymaking and politics, a tradition which, we think, has a much wider relevance for understanding contemporary politics than is often appreciated (for an overview, cf. Gibbons, 1987, Rabinow and Sullivan 1979). Rooted in the tradition of the American pragmatism of John Dewey and reinforced by the work of Harold Lasswell (Lasswell 1951; Lasswell 1971) and many others, the interpretative approach to public policy has contributed to a more subtle
understanding of policymaking and politics already.

Over the last twenty-five years interpretative policy analysis has primarily been engaged in a methodological and foundational debate with its positivist counterpart. This has resulted in a strong body of work, in which the biases and limitations of mainstream policy analysis were systematically spelled out (Tribe 1972, Hawkesworth 1988, Dryzek 1989, Yanow 1996, Stone 1997). In this context the label ‘postpositivist’ policy analysis was of course useful and appropriate. However, it also may have led some to regard interpretative analysis as merely a ‘counter-narrative’ to the dominant narrative of mainstream, institutionalized policy analysis. It has also led some to proclaim that the post-positivists were engaged in a futile fight with a positivist straw man of their own making, as, clearly, positivism is an antiquated ideal, and no self-respecting policy analyst actually follows the positivist precepts in his everyday working routines. In this book we hope to correct that picture. First, positivism is not just a set of methodological principles but, as the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski observed, above all an attitude towards knowledge (Kolakowski 1968), with deeply intertwined ramifications that range from a barely articulated ontological understanding of reality, via methodological principles of how to collect data in a proper way, to a rhetoric of accepted ways of talking about knowledge and policy. In practice this means that positivism does not restrict itself to the conduct of the social science, but also, and more importantly, includes normative beliefs and habits of governance and policymaking. Far from being a straw man, positivism is above all a practice of policymaking that is deeply rooted in the institutions of modern government (see also Fischer, this volume). Second, the interpretative approach has solid philosophical underpinnings that precede the policy analytic debate of the last two decades, as Gottweis and Yanow show in this book. In addition, as Fischer (this volume) argues, postpositivist policy analysis displays much greater sociological validity as mainstream analysis. Careful ethnographic observation of scientific work in research labs has shown the extent to which application of scientific methods to concrete problems involves all sorts of improvised, on-the-spot practical judgments that do not conform to the official, objective logic of science (Latour 1987, Lynch 1985).

Third, and most important, the last decade saw an attempt within postpositivist policy analysis to gauge the relationship, both normative and empirical, between policy analysis and the democratic environment in which it functions. Heeding Lasswell’s call for a ‘policy science of democracy’, analysts such as John Dryzek and Peter deLeon have explicitly attempted to assess the place of policy analysis in contemporary representative democracy, and, given the widespread discontent with ‘politics’ in many western countries, explored the alternatives that
might be available (Dryzek 1989). These developments within policy science merge with other developments that point towards the importance of problem formulation and practical judgment in understanding policy problems and finding policy solutions. For example, the analysis of stubborn or ‘intractable’ policy controversies (Schön and Rein 1994) illuminated that problem solving required a much better understanding of how various parties framed the situation, thus arguing – at least by implication - in favor of a more direct involvement of societal parties in policymaking processes. The Argumentative Turn in Policy and Planning, edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester, and subsequent studies, established once and for all the importance of attending to the discursive dimension of public policy and politics (Fischer 1993, Hajer 1995, Yanow 1996). And solid work in planning theory demonstrated how planners in concrete situations of conflict relied on interactive and deliberative processes of discovering ends, recognizing other parties, marshalling evidence, and giving reasons, exploring the implications of various value positions, and developing joint responsibility in concrete situations. Such deliberative approaches to public policy emphasize collective, pragmatic, participatory, local problem solving in the recognition that many problems are simply too complicated, too contested, and too unstable to allow for schematic, centralized regulation (Forester 1999, King 1998, Fung 2001, Innes & Booher, this volume, Healey et al., this volume).

This book is thus an attempt to build upon these foundations. Deliberative Policy Analysis explores ways in which interpretative and deliberative methods of policy analysis help us to come to grips with the political phenomena of our time. It is also an account of the intellectual development of this scholarship after seminal books such as the aforementioned Argumentative Turn in Policy and Planning, Frame Reflection or The Deliberative Practitioner (Fischer & Forester 1993, Schön & Rein 1994, Forester 1999). Yet it is also a book showing that some of the themes that long dominated the critical interpretative agenda -- such as the commitment to ‘participation’ -- are in need of a critical reexamination (Innes & Booher, this volume, Torgerson, this volume, Wagenaar & Cook, this volume). In the remainder of this introduction we will spell out the focus of the book in more detail.

Policymaking and Politics in the Network Society: Five Challenges for Analysis
This book explores the changing manifestations of policymaking and politics. It shows new themes for analysis inspired by the macro-sociological work on the network society, the new modernity, or reflexive modernization (Castells 1997, 1998, Beck 1999, Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994, Lash, 1996, Giddens 1991, 1992). The essays combine this macro-sociological orientation with a strong commitment to concrete empirical work. Instead of paraphrasing the work of these sociologists, we distinguish five concrete challenges to policymaking and politics in the era of the network society. Each of them has repercussions for the analysis of policymaking and politics. Together they set the frame for the book.

1. The new spaces of politics

In the classical-modernist conception political institutions complied to an implicit conceptual ‘Matrouchka’ system. Like Russian dolls, governments were conceived to fit into one another (local fits in regional, fits in national, fits in international containers) and the political space was related to this Matrouchka system. This model loses its heuristic power: politics and policymaking often happen in configurations that do not conform to the old formats (Dryzek, 1999, Held 1995, Eriksen & Fossum 2000). Politics in the network society is characterized by a search for ‘multi-level governance’, ‘regimes’, or ‘transnational policy discourses’ (Hajer 2000).

This reconstitution of political action can be observed at all levels of governing: in the domain of international politics, within the borders of the nation state, regionally and even locally. Politics and policymaking are reinvented. Traditional top-down bureaucratic structures make way for civil servants, citizens, and private sector actors that act as ‘entrepreneur’ or ‘problem solvers’ in policy networks of their own making (Sabel, Fung & Karkkainen 2001, Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan eds. 1997). Party politics, once the domain of the big debates on the big decisions, finds its central role challenged. In some cases media create political issues, in other cases it is political action from civil society that speaks to the heart of the people much more effectively than the leader-dependent party political practices (Manin 1997). Moreover, there is also a very concrete challenge to the practices of policymaking and politics coming from below. The emergence of ‘life politics’ (Giddens 1991) implies a new style of political involvement in which people combine life style choices with very focused and discontinuous political activity. Bang & Sörensen captured this in the phenomenon of the ‘everyday maker’: a type of political activity at grassroots level that resists conceptualization in the familiar terms of participation, social movement or interest group (Bang & Sörensen 1999).

In all cases we see how the topography of politics changes as politics and policymaking is made
in new spaces. Characteristically, these new spaces of politics initially exist in an institutional void: there are no pre-given rules that determine who is responsible, who has authority over whom, what sort of accountability is to be expected. Yet as politics takes place in between organizations, all people bring their own institutional expectations and routines with them. And, as different participants follow their own ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 1995), politics in new political spaces is never only about content, but inevitably also about the rules of the game and a dynamics of credibility.

To be able to make sense of this sort of complicated communication the scholarship on the politics of symbols and meaning comes in handy. For a long time interpretative social science has focused on the symbolic politics and has shown how symbols are not to be mistaken for cute epiphenomena of politics but constitute a key dimension of power and influence in an era of constitutional politics (cf. Edelman 1964). In the instability of a network society this dimension of power and influence deserves our careful attention.

2. Politics and policymaking under the condition of radical uncertainty

Writing on the impossibility of absolute judgements, Milan Kundera once observed that man is like somebody walking in the mist (Kundera 1992). Yet whenever he looks back to judge the behavior of people in the past – Mayakovsky, Goffried Benn, Heidegger - he sees no mist but only clarity. Kundera wondered who are blinder, those who do not see the mist of uncertainty that always surrounds people or those that made the decisions that we – helped by the clarity of hindsight – later see as problematic. It is a useful reminder now that we so often find the suggestion that the challenge for the analysis of policymaking and politics can be captured in terms of the enhanced complexity of society (cf. e.g. Roe 1994). Although it is tempting, it is not unproblematic to suggest that the present is more complex and unpredictable than before. So if we say that some of the most pressing problems of today require us to make ‘hard’ decisions with only ‘soft’ evidence (Ravetz) we should probably add that this is not particularly new.

However, in another sense the network society does indeed add something that constitutes a particular form of complexity for politics and policymaking. The failures of classical-modernist government have created a widespread awareness of the ubiquity of the unintended, perverse consequences of large-scale rationalized planning and the limits to centralized, hierarchical regulation as the dominant mode of collective problem solving (Scott 1998). In its wake it has created a deep unease among citizens about the possibilities of effective and responsible state power. This new social awareness now constitutes a pool of uncertainty surrounding major
projects. It is essentially a democratization of knowledge that has created the social explosiveness of many contemporary practices (Beck 1992). Networks are not only often ‘tightly coupled’ and therefore vulnerable systems (Perrow), policy makers are now also forced to rethink the way in which uncertainties are dealt with socially. The sudden politicization of food in Europe over the twin crises of BSE and mouth-and-foot disease strongly speaks to this. Whereas within the old regulatory regime the idea prevailed that one could still employ the ‘knowledge for policy’ practice (‘first get the facts right’), the new political reality is one in which this is no longer a credible policymaking strategy. Ulrich Beck has nicely put this condition to words, arguing that we now have an increased ‘awareness of our unawareness’ (1999:123). There is a widespread appreciation that governments cannot legitimately keep up the idea that decisions can only be made once the appropriate knowledge is available. Quite the contrary, the new condition is one in which politics has to be made under conditions of ‘radical uncertainty’ while social protest cannot be controlled with a traditional politics of expertise (Fischer 1993).

This political-sociological shift implies the demise of the myth of absolute knowledge in the public domain. This backfires on the longstanding commitment of policy analysis to deliver knowledge for policy. Under conditions of radical uncertainty policy makers must be made aware of the limits of the (quickly) knowable. Concrete problem solving, joint responsibility, continuous performance-based and collective learning become potential building stones of a viable alternative strategy. In more practical terms the appreciation of these limits calls for the introduction of concepts like the ‘precautionary principle’ according to which we institutionally aim to avoid risks knowing that science might, ultimately, shown the inconceivable (such as the role of previously unknown ‘prions’ in the BSE case) to be true. Although this awareness that the condition of radical uncertainty challenges the practices of politics and policymaking is now widespread, institutions are often slow in responding.

3. The increased importance of ‘difference’ for our understanding of politics

Modern societies have become culturally more complex. Solving public problems now almost inevitably requires us to deal with an array of groups that do not necessarily share the same language. This might often be true in the literal sense, as with the rise of Spanish as a first language in the US, or with the linguistic complexity of policymaking in the European Union. Yet it is of course even more widespread if we interpret languages as general systems of signification. Various groups of people conceive of the world in different terms. Here the variety
in the concepts and categories that people employ to make sense of the world complicates mutual understanding. Of course, this phenomenon of cultural difference as such is not new, and there is indeed a scholarship that has been addressing such issues in policy analysis (Yanow 1996, 2000), yet the increased importance of difference magnifies the problem of translation: between languages, between discourses, and ultimately between people (cf. Yanow, this volume; Torgerson, this volume). The principle meaning of difference is well understood (Benhabib 1996) but still calls for much more empirical input in terms of its implications for the ways in which policymaking and politics are to be conducted.

4. Acting upon an awareness of interdependence

The fourth feature of policymaking and politics in the network society is the increased awareness of interdependence. If the condition of difference radically alters the nature of policy-making processes by posing the problem of translation, interdependence brings up the need to overcome these very real discursive barriers. If groups recognize that they are interdependent -- whether this is because they share the same physical space or face the same social or environmental problems -- they will recognize that they cannot solve key problems without collaboration. If the traditional forms of government are unable to deliver – either because of a lack of legitimacy or simply because there is a mismatch between the scope of the problem and the existing territorial jurisdictions -- then networks of actors must create the capacity to interact and communicate. This awareness seems to facilitate a new creativity in thinking about new modes of conflict resolution that suggest the essence of dealing with policy conflicts might be a more substantial process of deliberation, shared problem solving, and developing regimes of joint responsibility than merely interest-based bargaining. Policymaking becomes an activity of creating what Hannah Arendt once called ‘communities of action’, able to arrive at shared problem definitions and to agree on common paths of problem resolution.

5. Policymaking and the dynamics of trust and identity

Following from the above is the issue of the dynamics of trust in contemporary politics. With hindsight we see how the ‘normal politics’ of the postwar era could mostly rely on the trust and confidence that people collectively stored in or derived from constitutionally embedded institutions. Of course, trust was never simply there. There was an array of rituals and myths that helped sustain trust in government, from the quasi-political role of royalty in some European countries to the widespread reinforcement of governmental action in the relatively
uncomplicated media landscape. Now that the magic of these practices is no longer self-evident, we can also see how they always fulfilled a key role as rituals that formed the ideological and emotive cement of national political systems.

It follows that in the ‘new politics’, in which, typically, actors have to collaborate by transgressing institutional boundaries, trust cannot be assumed. Politics and policymaking thus is not simply about finding solutions for pressing problems, it is as much about finding formats that generate trust among mutually interdependent actors. The concept of network society helps to understand why it is that we have become interested in themes like ‘trust’, ‘interdependence’, and ‘institutional capacity’. If problems cannot be solved within the preconceived scales of government, and we still feel the need to address them, we will have to invent new political practices. Here trust suddenly pops up as a key variable that we took for granted for a long time (Warren 1999).

The significance of this new understanding of political process as potential generators of trust sheds new light on the range of ‘interactive’, ‘consensus-building’ and ‘round table’ practices that have emerged in the context of the network society. After all, the new interactive policymaking practices are often the first instance where people who share a particular space (whether this is a region or a neighborhood) actually meet. Policymaking thus gets a new meaning as a constitutive force in creating trust among interdependent people. As Forester and others have rightly observed, trust is made by active participation in collective action and problem solving. (Forester 1999, Lave 1991, Sabel 2001). Moreover, it can be shown that the discussions within these policymaking practices generate much more than straightforward debates on solutions for shared problems. Interactive policymaking now is a practice within which people generate new identities. Understanding this dynamic of identities not only proves of great value for generating instrumental solutions for policy problems, it also turns the relationship of politics and policy on its head. Whereas previously policies where the outcome of political battles among political parties, we nowadays see how citizens themselves get worked up about various policy initiatives (or the lack thereof) and become politically active for the very first time. The mediations via political parties, with their meanings and manifestos, makes way for a erratic but no less political struggle in the context of specific policy domains.

If the established institutional routines of party politics and neo-corporatist bargaining loose their heuristic value as channels of interest representation, if citizens no longer feel able to identify fully with particular leaders of parties of unions, then policymaking de facto gets a
new status. One of the points shown in this volume is that present day ‘policymaking’ has become much more important as a stage for politics than before. Whereas in the past we used to think of policymaking as the consequence of political will formation (‘We should rebuild the inner cities!’) it now is often policymaking process that leads to political will formation (Hajer, this volume).

Towards a Deliberative Policy Analysis

So, given this changing social and political landscape, the question we address in this book is: *what kind of policy analysis might be relevant to understand governance in the emerging network society?* As will be obvious, we claim that an interpretative, deliberative approach to policy analysis is relevant here. This implies that a new interpretative policy analysis finds its warrant not so much by being epistemologically or methodologically different from the mainstream approach, but first of all by demonstrating its analytic fertility and practical usefulness in the context of the changes we described in the preceding section.

Key to our interpretative approach is the insight that a certain conception of the way scientific method should proceed, and its grounding in beliefs about epistemology, almost inevitably leads to a certain conception of society; an understanding of how society should be organized and managed. Over the last decades the critique of positivist policy analysis has shown that epistemological beliefs, wittingly or unwittingly, have normative consequences for one’s political preferences. What counts as justified belief and valid knowledge sets limits to the kind of questions and information that are acceptable in the political debate. And what has standing in societal discourse determines not only who is allowed into the halls of decision making and who is kept out, it also designates what is considered a legitimate political argument in political discourse and what not, which rules of interpersonal political conduct are preferred over others, and, ultimately, what kind of society we envision ourselves to live in. These issues gain a new relevance in a network society marked by a greater variety of value preferences, unclear rules of the game and great challenges in terms of shaping society.

Interpretative policy analysis, as both Fischer and Yanow argue in this volume, differs markedly from its positivist counterpart. Positivist epistemology is an attempt to erect a firewall between scientific procedure and political organization. Instead we suggest in this book that the way to think about this relation is in terms of fit: a fit between a conception of
science and knowledge on the one hand and the nature of political organization on the other. The link between the two is the way that a particular conception of epistemology, and in its wake, a conception of the purpose and methods of the policy sciences, simultaneously enables and limits opportunities for collective inquiry and for knowledge thus acquired to contribute to the solution of social problems and the development of political identity.

How, then, does a policy analysis that fits the currently emerging network society look like? Given the intellectual impact of *The Argumentative Turn* on the policy field, it seems no more than fair that we take this book as our point of reference. Interestingly, only half of the ‘message’ of that book seems to have been taken up in the literature. Fischer and Forester sought to make the policy analysis community aware of the consequences of the role of language in policymaking. As will be remembered, they argued that language doesn’t just mirror reality; it actively shapes the way we perceive and understand it. Yet this immediately brought up issues of value, distortion, and outside influence onto the work of the analyst. As Fischer and Forester put it:

“The controversy of relevance to policy analysis and planning here involves central questions of truth and power. If analysts’ ways of representing reality are necessarily selective, they seem as necessarily bound up with relations of power, agenda setting, inclusion and exclusion, selective attention, and neglect. If analysts’ ways of representing policy and planning issues must make assumptions about causality and responsibility, about legitimacy and authority, and about interest, needs, values, preferences, and obligations, then the language of policy and planning analyses not only depicts but also constructs the issues at hand.” (Fischer & Forester 1993)

This part of their argument was enthusiastically – with hindsight perhaps somewhat too enthusiastically - embraced in the policy literature since and resulted in reams and reams of interpretative and narrative policy analysis of dubious validity. If there was no objective reality, and if the insights of the analyst were ever so many constructions, it seemed that questions of precision, validity, and generalizability were no longer important. Intrinsically, so it seemed, policy analysis represented a point of view, so why not declare this up front and side with whatever group the analyst chose to represent?

Yet in the second, and much less recognized part of their argument, Fischer and Forester explicitly countervail this relativism. Here they situate policy argument in the context of practice. Worldviews are not made out of whole cloth, but are shaped, incrementally, painfully, in the struggle of everyday people with concrete, ambiguous, tenacious, practical problems and questions. Their deep understanding of, and respect for, the day-to-day work
of planners and policy makers shapes the editors’ understanding of the new face of policy analysis. People in such situations tell stories and formulate arguments to get a handle on this world of complexity and uncertainty, but stories and arguments are social commodities, not abstract, arm-chair constructs designed by analysts far removed from the concrete policy scene. Their validity and feasibility are assessed in communities of people who are knowledgeable about the problem at hand, and who are all too conscious of the political, financial and practical constraints that define the situation for which they bear responsibility. These are people who realize that stories and arguments are always provisional, never the last word on the situation. They hold up until the situation changes, constraints are tightened or relaxed, and/or a better story is told. Action, thus, structures and disciplines understanding. In this sense designing good policy arguments is itself a practice. To quote Fischer and Forester once more:

“To see policy analysis as argumentative practices is to attend closely to the day-to-day work analysts do as they construct accounts of problems and possibilities. Recognizing these accounts as constrained, organizational accomplishments in the face of little time and poor data. We can evaluate the analysts’ arguments not only for their truth or falsity but also for their partiality, their selective framing of the issues at hand, their elegance or crudeness of presentation, their political timeliness, their symbolic significance, and more. Policy and planning arguments are practical productions.” (1993: 2-3)

In this book we will pick up on this view of policy analysis that Fischer and Forester outlined almost ten years ago. However, we will not just draw out and elaborate upon some of their insights that were more or less implicit in their original statement. In particular we will bring into our analytic orbit the societal context in which a new interpretative policy analysis has to play a role.

Similar to Fischer and Forester our understanding of policy analysis is geared towards the concrete, everyday activities of citizens, politicians, and administrators. Thus, when there is talk of ‘democracy’, what we have in mind is not some abstract philosophical idea of democracy, but the concrete organization of collective social and political life ‘as we know it’. Whatever we have to say about the nature and foundation of the policy sciences, its litmus test will be that it must ‘work’ for the everyday reality of modern democracy. Yet we also believe that the practical applicability of the policy sciences has been hampered in the past by erroneous beliefs about the nature of the social sciences, their relation to political practice,
and their respective philosophical foundations (cf. also Fischer, this volume). Paraphrasing a famous dictum, we believe that “nothing is as practicable as a well-understood epistemology”. The underlying theme here is an issue that has all too often remained implicit in mainstream policy analysis: what kind of knowledge is politically relevant to society? And, to apply this to the network society, what counts as good evidence in this society of flux? How should we conceive of the relation between analysis and democracy in that context? So, wherever necessary, we will indicate the philosophical justification of what we believe policy science should look like. Although our focus is practical, on policy analysis in concrete everyday situations, our analysis of inquiry and practice takes epistemology into account.

**Policy analysis for the network society**

How then should we conceive of a policy science that fits the contemporary network society; a policy science that is up to the five challenges of the preceding section? We will argue that a policy science whose epistemological features correspond to the nature of modern democracy rests on three pillars: interpretation, practice and deliberation. In the remainder of this introduction we will discuss in more detail these three pillars and how they relate to distinct features of the network society.

*Policy analysis is interpretative.* Mainstream policy analysis rests on philosophical realism. It assumes that the data and observations that form the input of its analytic techniques are non-problematical, or, as Kolakowski puts it, that “there is no real difference between ‘essence’ and ‘phenomenon’” (1968: 3). This assumption about the way policy analysis hooks onto the external world is central to the promise of rational policy analysis to deliver objective, certain, knowledge to their political taskmasters. Its scientific authority as a final arbiter of politically charged questions is intimately connected to the philosophical assumption of realism. Yet, it is precisely this assumption that has been the focus of intense criticism in post-war analytic philosophy.

In its unadulterated, naive, form philosophical realism rests on the twin assumptions a) that a world exists that is independent of our knowledge or consciousness of it, and b) that we have access to that world in a pure form, independent of the techniques to perceive or apprehend that external world (Bailey 2000). Our images of the world are imprints on a passive mind;
the workings of the mind kick in only after the imprints, the brute sense data, have been registered. Words, in this view, are nothing more than labels for stable objects in the external world (hence, the apt depiction of naive realism as the ‘museum view of reference’). It is this understanding of the relation between mind and world that has been the focus of attack in post-war analytic philosophy, particularly in a number of famous articles by Quine (Quine 1961, Quine 1969). Quine’s position is that the relation between words and objects is intrinsically undetermined. That is, the semantic meaning of a word is not so much a fixed relation between a particular mental image and an object out there in the world, but arises out of our understanding of other people’s behavioral dispositions towards the object in question.

As Quine puts it:

“Seen according to the museum myth, the words and sentences of a language have their determinate meanings. To discover the meaning of the native’s words we may have to observe his behavior, but still the meaning of the words are supposed to be determined in the native’s mind. His mental museum, even in cases where behavioral criteria are powerless to discover them for us. When on the other hand we recognize with Dewey that ‘meaning…is primarily a property of behavior’, we recognize that there are no meanings, nor likenesses nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people’s dispositions to overt behavior.”(1969: 29)

The implications of this behavioral conception of meaning and reference for the way we struggle with the meaning of words are momentous. To mention just a few: meaning is the product, not of individual mental processes, but of human communities. Behavioral disposition is a synonym for the habits and conventions of collective human practices. Second, if we leave the museum view of meaning behind, it is no longer useful to think of meaning in terms of single words. For example, the meaning of the word ‘fish’ is dependent on a cloud of associated meanings (and their behavioral dispositions) such as ‘mammal’, ‘bird’, ‘water’, etc. The argument applies a fortiori to the words of social reality such as ‘labor’ or ‘natural environment’, which can only be understood through a deep understanding of the complex cultural dispositions and habits in which such terms are embedded. Third, and perhaps most important to our argument, exactly how you construct meanings out of a cluster of behavioral dispositions is undecided by the behavioral dispositions themselves. Differently put, the behavioral dispositions surrounding the term ‘labor’ or ‘natural environment’ do not themselves contain any decision rules that decide in advance how to derive in a necessary or undisputed way the ‘pure’ meaning of the terms ‘labor’ or ‘natural environment’. The manner
in which we slice the nebula of surrounding meanings has to come from outside those meanings, for example from a particular background theory or grand narrative that serves as frame of reference, or a set of behavioral dispositions that is anchored in particular way of life or a particular way of doing things.

What we are on to here is the ontological correlate to *The Argumentative Turn*. In concrete everyday situations people create meaning out of their behavioral dispositions, or, in the vocabulary of Fischer and Forester, by participating in practices. Like theirs, Quine’s argument prevents extreme relativism in the determination of semantic meaning. Most people will have a sufficient working knowledge of terms such as ‘labor’ to enable them to participate in a general discussion or write a letter to the editor about, for example, the desirability or foolishness of active labor market policies. How we interpret social reality, both as an ordinary person or a policy analyst, is to a large extent guided by the social rules that constitute social practices; rules we have internalized in long processes of habituation and socialization (Fay 1975:75). Yet, the exact semantic meaning of what actors argue is not out there, visible for all, in the words and phrases that make up a discussion or letter to the editor, nor in some after-the-fact conclusion that this or that action must have been guided by such and such social rule. Rather it is comprised of the total of the underlying narratives and behavioral dispositions that make up that particular individual’s life world.

The upshot of this argument is that meaning and context are only loosely coupled. Understanding of what an actor wants to convey therefore has something of the Münchhausen effect. How actors slice their context to construct semantic meaning can only be understood by reconstructing, on line, during their interactions with others, what it is that the actors want to convey. Actors and their audiences thereby rely on what they have in common; on the lifestyle and cultural content they share. Wagenaar and Hartendorp’s analysis of the story of a welfare administrator (Wagenaar 2000) is an example of how meaning construction in the everyday world of public administration functions. It shows a practice of meaning making that, although ambiguous and open-ended, is remarkable well adapted to the inconsistencies and contradictions that are characteristic of the everyday world of administrators in a fragmented bureaucratic environment that characterized by power differentials and lack of coordination, and by extension, characteristic of the world of policy makers and citizens in general.

*Policy analysis is practice-oriented.* The obligation to act upon the situation at hand is the
decisive characteristic of the work of policy makers and public administrators. At the same time we believe the action orientation of political and administrative work has been consistently overlooked in the policy sciences. Here we seem to struggle with the legacy of the father of positivism, Auguste Comte. Of all his beliefs and assumptions, the primacy of thought over action in the analysis of concerted social action is perhaps the most inveterate, to the point that it has become an unnoticed intellectual habit with both admirers and detractors of positivism. In all of his writings Comte proved himself to be highly suspicious of practitioners. Social reform could not be ‘confided to merely practical men’, and the ‘spiritual’, read intellectual, and ‘temporal’, read practical, power should be kept separated at all costs (Comte, in Lenzer 1975:xl). In fact, Comte saw social reform as an essentially theoretical endeavor. The design of the new social scheme, the ‘ensemble’ according to Comte, was a purely theoretical project, based upon the general social laws that were the fruit of the ‘science social’. The implementation of this scheme was considered an afterthought by Comte; as merely a matter of ‘details’ that followed seamlessly from the theoretical scheme, and that belonged to the realm of practical man. “The labor of social reorganization”, according to Comte, “is in essence theoretical” (Comte in Lenzer 1975: xl, emphasis added.). All this would be mere historical curiosity if echoes of this position would not resonate through the policy sciences to this very day. In fact, the policy sciences in their modern day institutional form are themselves based on a deep-seated suspicion of ‘politics’. The promise of traditional, rational policy analysis is precisely to sanitize political decision making from irrational politics. Moreover, the relation between analysis, and implementation, as presented for example in a classic of policy analysis as Stokey & Zeckhauser, has the same automatic, even tautological, quality as with Comte. If the analytic techniques are applied well, then the ‘one best decision’ follows automatically (Stokey 1978). From the rational perspective, the analysis of social problems is at heart a cerebral, armchair activity (Allison 1999). We believe that one of the main reasons for the often observed ineffectiveness and irrelevance of the traditional policy sciences is precisely this Cartesian bias; the gap between the theoretical rationality of the policy sciences and the practical rationality of the practitioner. Policy makers and administrators work under the legal or organizational obligation to come up with solutions for concrete, specific issues in areas for which they bear, mandated by their job description, responsibility. For example, an administrator in a child protection agency has to decide either to place a battered child in a foster family or to let the child stay with its dysfunctional family. A police officer has to decide to break up a street brawl or trust upon
the powers of reason within the group of unruly young man. The obligation to act is not restricted to street level bureaucrats, but applies with equal force to higher-level administrators. For example, the chief personnel officer at some ministry has to decide how and at what moment to present a plan for reorganization to the secretary-general. The public prosecutor has to decide if and how he will deal with law-transgressions of police officers. The mayor has to decide whether or not to evict a squatter house with the risk of sparking large riots. These are situations that involve practical judgment, reflection, and the bringing to bear of knowledge and experience, but above all, these are situations that require the administrator to act, to step into the situation and do something about it.

Interestingly, the emergence of the concept of ‘governance’ in the contemporary debate seems to lead in some cases to a renewed appreciation for the action dimension in public policy. For example, the cases of a new politics in the network society that are analyzed in the first past of this book (Innes & Booher, Healey et al., Hajer), all step away from the rationalist scheme of preconceived preferences and clearly defined means to achieve these. Instead, we see practitioners of very different plumage wrestle with conflict, power, uncertainty and unpredictability. Solutions are not so much formulated as arrived at, haltingly, tentatively, through acting upon the situation at hand and through the application of practical wisdom in negotiating concrete situations. And always, there is the risk of policy failure and stagnation, as the airport case in Wagenaar & Cook (this volume) shows. Consequently, as these cases demonstrate, the role of policy analysis changes too. It is no longer about the invention of solutions for society; it often finds itself in the ‘mud’ of policy practice, trying to assist in the discovery of new policy options and the formulation of compelling arguments.

How does a policy science that takes the fundamental action orientation of policymaking (and public administration for that matter) serious, look like? Traditional policy science focuses on ‘problems’ and ‘decisions’. We suggest that a reformulated, deliberative policy science takes practices as its unit of analysis. Practice, as Wagenaar & Cook argue in this volume, is despite its current popularity in post-positivist policy writings a notoriously difficult concept to grasp. Practice is more a theoretical perspective than a single concept. It is an attempt to develop a unified account of knowing and doing. It expresses the insight that knowledge, knowledge application, and knowledge creation cannot be separated from action; that acting is the high road to knowing. Yet, it would be wrong to see the concept of practice as merely a synonym for action. Practice theory integrates the actor, his beliefs and values, his resources and his external environment in one ‘activity system’, in which social, individual and material
aspects are interdependent. The focus in such activity systems is on the way the different elements *relate* to each other rather than on the elements itself. Practice theory focuses on action as a central strategy through which the individual gains knowledge about the world. It suggests that people negotiate the world (both social and physical) by *acting* upon it. Also, the concept of practice presupposes the social. It implies that in negotiating a particular situation the actor is always aware of his or her position in a larger network of relations and obligations. People learn about the world in public, shared processes in which they test what they have learned. The way they test the relevance and validity of their knowledge in particular situations is through public discourse. The concept of practice thus stresses communication and other-directedness. And, finally, the practice concept stresses value. Actors, in interpretively moving about in their environment, articulate value in appreciating the possibilities and limitations of the situation at hand. Values tell them what is worth paying attention to and serve as compelling reasons for what we do in concrete situations.

The upshot is that the practice perspective introduces an awareness of the importance of practical judgment – *phronesis* in Aristotelian terms – in policy analysis. With this it acts as a corrective to both institutional and discourse-analytic explanations of public policy. Institutional explanations often assume a one-way influence of the institutional context upon the actor. In this sense, institutional explanations beg the question of how actors in fact organize the particulars of their institutional environment to move about in an effective and feasible manner in the concrete situation at hand. Practice theory aims to overcome the traditional actor-structure dichotomy by exploring the dialectic between the two, where, in the process of acting in a concrete situation, each brings the other into being. Practice theory also transcends discourse analysis in that it shows that the everyday actions of policy actors underlie, often in an unrecognized way, the very entities and categories that make up political narratives about contentious social issues. Moreover, as Fischer also points out in his contribution to this book, a focus on practice firmly roots interpretative analysis in the concrete objects, experiences, and constraints of the world around us, thereby putting limits on what is plausible in the interpretation of policy texts and ‘text analogues’.

*Policy analysis is deliberative.* When we talk of community in this book, we are not thinking of abstract or idealized theoretical constructs, but of living entities that can be identified in space and time. We have in mind social entities made up of people who are in one way or another engaged with their environment, both their immediate and their proximal
environment. Their engagement is both fueled and expressed in their passions and feelings about certain situations. They harbor sympathies and antipathies towards the people that make up their world. They are strongly committed to some subjects and indifferent and apathetic towards others. They see the plans and actions of their government or other actors as furthering or threatening their interests – and, in a more tacit and implicit manner, as strengthening or confounding their collective identity. Above all, they perceive and organize their world through more or less articulated value positions on a range of subjects. As a consequence, conflict is intrinsic to human communities. Policy issues are almost by definition contested. Moreover, resources of money and power are differentially distributed over the actors involved. Often these differences erupt in more or less deep-seated conflicts. Sometimes conflicts transform in stalemate and policy controversies, which are immune to fact or reason (Schön & Rein 1994). Whatever reformulation of policy sciences we can come up with, both methodologically and epistemologically, it must be up to the task of understanding and furthering the interests of such real-world, conflict-ridden, living communities.

The conflictual, adversarial nature of policy communities is not just an empirical observation; it is important to be aware that it has philosophical grounding too. It is, by now, a well-accepted insight in contemporary moral philosophy that, inevitably, in the everyday concrete world we inhabit at some point the great values begin to contradict each other. ‘Value pluralism’ describes the condition in which conceptions of desirable social states are plural and in which the realization of these conceptions mutually exclude each other. As the philosopher John Kekes puts it: “Pluralists are committed (…) to the view that the conceptions of a good life and the values on whose realization good lives depend are plural and conditional. These conceptions and values, however, are often related in such a way, according to the pluralists, that the realization of one excludes the realization of the other” (Kekes 1993: 21). ‘Conditional’ in this phrase means that no value or moral code exists that is sufficiently authoritative to always override other values in case of conflict. Instead pluralists assert that every value or combination of values may be defeated by some other value or combination of values that, in the specific context, is more important (Kekes 1993: 20). Perhaps no one has expressed this inherent feature of human community better than Isaiah Berlin. “Some among the Great Goods”, as he puts it, “cannot live together” (Berlin 1997). Value pluralism as an inescapable condition of everyday life regularly brings policy makers in situations of deep value conflict (Wagenaar 1999, Hajer 2002). Obviously, traditional policy
analysis with its epistemological bias towards emotivism (the belief that values are nothing more than expressions of feeling and therefore beyond the reach of logic), and its methodological concomitant, the strict separation of fact and value, has been unable to deal with value pluralism. Value conflict has been as a result not only under-acknowledged as a regular feature of policymaking, but traditional, positivist policy analysts have developed little or no understanding of the way ordinary people, including ordinary policy makers and administrators, handle value conflict (Wagenaar 1999) The entrance into dealing with value conflict is the conditionality of values. Value pluralists, as we saw at the start of the preceding section, believe values to be conditional in they think that the context in which values are realized determine their relative weight relative to one another. In fact, although value and context can be distinguished, in the everyday experience of individual policy makers or administrators, values cannot be seen apart from their context, similar to the way that in the act of listening the pitch and the typical sound color of a violoncello cannot be separated. Everyday policy makers deal with value conflict through the exertion of practical judgment (Larmore 1987).

This is not the place to describe in detail all that is involved in practical judgment. In summary form, practical judgment is immediate, intuitive, concrete, interactive, pragmatic, personal and action-oriented. Moreover, practical judgment is something that comes natural to people. It is something they do in the course of their everyday activities, usually without giving it much thought. Practical judgment is problem-oriented. It is an integral part of people’s problem solving activities, in which the joint construction of feasible problem definitions is as important as the solution of those agreed upon problems. This interactive working on problems is relational and emotive. It involves the maintenance of relations as a form of political rationality; that is, as a way assuring the cooperation of others on dealing with future problems. In addition, a perceptive, balanced understanding of the feelings and emotions a particular situation generates is an important element of practical judgment. Emotions function simultaneously as a mode of perception and discernment, and as a way of giving meaning to facts, events and behavior under circumstances of uncertainty. As will be clear by now, practical judgment, contrary to received opinion, is not something that happens inside the mind of individual actors. Rather it both emerges and is accounted for in people’s continuous interactions with each other. As John Forester summarizes it: “Before the rationality of choice comes the prior practical rationality of careful attention, critical listening, setting out issues, and exploring working relationships as pragmatic aspects of problem
construction” (Forester 1999: 34). Practical judgment aims as much at good result as at proper procedure. But what counts as result is, given the multitude of constraints that characterize most policy situations, usually not the definitive resolution of a conflict, but the discovery of a workable definition of the problem, or the temporary stabilization of a situation that is unhinged or threatens to become so, or the emergence of personal insight that allows the actor to function more effectively in the situation at hand. Concrete, everyday situations are characterized above all by, what Hilary Putnam calls, the ‘interpenetration’ of fact, value and theory. Putnam uses this phrase to emphasize, as he states, “that the interdependence of which I speak is not an interdependence of elements which can always be distinguished, even notionally” (Putnam 1995: 57). To find their way in such situations people deliberate. Such deliberation, as will now be obvious, should not be confused with the kind of systematic, principled reasoning of traditional moral philosophy. Rather, deliberative judgment emerges through collective, interactive discourse. As we saw above, telling stories and reacting to each other’s stories in situations of collective action, does a lot of the work of practical judgment (Forester 1999, Wagemaan 1997). As a result practical judgment is not a one-shot affair, but on the contrary evolves slowly, often tentatively and haltingly, though mutual inquiry and mutual discourse with others.

Conclusion: the transformative work of policy analysis

In this introduction we have attempted to sketch the contours of a deliberative policy science. At the outset of the second section, we described our challenge in terms of fit; that is we outlined a policy science that helps to understand the new forms of governance that are emerging in the network society that we described in the first section. Summing up, we argue for a careful analysis of these new practices of governance, without immediately suggesting they all represent successful examples of deliberative democracy. After all, in some cases there is reason to be skeptical about any suggestion that the emergence of new loose forms equals the withering away of the state or heralds a new era of direct democracy. On the other hand, the experiments sometimes also produce remarkable results and, one may add, we are in need of new systems of governing in an era in which so many of the most pressing problems do not conform to the levels at which governmental institutions are most capable of producing
effective or legitimate solutions.

What we have added in this introduction is the suggestion that it is a deliberative policy analysis that helps us to understand these problems of governance. In this, we pointed at the changing nature of policymaking in the network society that, with hindsight, seems to support some of the critical claims of the argumentative turn in policy analysis. Indeed, the emergence of deliberative forms of planning and policy analysis we see as a retreat from the Absolute. This is more than merely the observation that policymaking now operates under conditions of radical uncertainty and deep value pluralism. The retreat from the Absolute implies the acknowledgement both on a philosophical and a pragmatic level, that the epistemic notion of certain, absolute knowledge, and its practical corollary of command and control, in concrete, everyday situations are deeply problematical. It is the insight that whatever knowledge we possess must be assessed for its relevance and usefulness in interaction with the concrete situation at hand, and that this ongoing process of assessment occurs in situations of intense social interaction. The capacity for practical judgment is above all a social good that is in high demand in the era of the network society. From this insight follow most of the observations and prescriptions about politics, policymaking and policy analysis we outlined above.

But perhaps most importantly, it follows that a deliberative analysis of policy and politics implies a radically altered conceptualization of citizenship, politics and the state. Deliberative policy science sides with, as we called it in the first section, an ‘enhanced’ conception of democracy. Not just as a normative statement of how we would like to see the relation between citizens and the state, but also, and more importantly, as an empirical observation of the direction things take in contemporary society. Politics and problem solving have changed character and it is our task to bring out the new ways in which politics and policymaking are conducted. This, above all, is how we envision the notion of a fit between policy science and policymaking in the network society. For policymaking it means not simply the straightforward ‘inclusion’ of those affected by public policy in the domain of policy formulation, decision-making, and administrative implementation, but also the search for the appropriate way of involving the many ‘others’ that are affected by it (cf. Torgerson, this volume). Participation is no longer a standard solution, it has to be reinvented and will appear in many different guises. It means the creation of well-considered linkages between citizens, traditional policy institutions, and the new and often unstable policymaking practices. For policy science the implication is a long due retreat from its dominant self-understanding as the provider of certain, ‘scientific’ knowledge about quasi non-problematical policy problems to a
clearly identifiable policymaking elite. Instead, a deliberative democracy and policy analysis both aim at creation and enhancement of the possibilities of self-transformation. It aims to create, through direct and active participation in democratic deliberation over concrete policy problems, to develop autonomy, or, a capacity for judgment (see Hajer, this volume). It is the insight that autonomy and self-transformation are not only instrumentally useful in that they enhance the collective capacity for productive inquiry, but also, and perhaps above all, intrinsically valuable. As Warren puts it:

“Without the experience of argument and challenge within democratic public spheres, individuals will have little sense for what relates them to, and distinguishes them from, others; and this deprives them of an essential condition of self-development. By raising one’s wants, needs and desires to the level of consciousness and by formulating them in speech, one increases one’s sense of identity and autonomy – aside from any advantages that might accrue from the substantive outcomes of collective decisions.” (Warren 1992: 12. Emphasis added)

Clearly, this outline for a deliberative policy science and policymaking raises more questions than we can answer in these introductory remarks. Yet, we also believe that we have little choice, given the widely documented limitations of classical-modernist representative politics and the failures of centralized policymaking in the emerging network society, to move along on the road towards deliberative democracy and deliberative policy analysis. The papers in this book are ever so many explorations of the possibilities and limitations, the benefits and drawbacks, the prospects for and obstacles to deliberative policy analysis in the network society, and thereby shed light on its core transformative promise.

**Outline of the book**

The first section, *Policy Conflict and Deliberation in the Network Society*, documents and analyses several experiments with new forms of governance, in Great Britain, California and the Netherlands. In all three cases new forms of policy deliberation emerged, next to or in between existing institutional arrangements. Apart from documenting the cases, the authors seek to come up with an analytical understanding of the dynamics of conflict resolution and policy deliberation.

In the first chapter Judith Innes and David Booher analyze of an array of experiments in
intergovernmental cooperation and consensus-building processes in the San Francisco Bay area. Innes and Booher point out that the experiments were successful in resolving stalemates in complex and controversial public issues concerning resource allocation, infrastructure development, fiscal reform, school reform and growth management. Introducing ‘collaborative dialogue’ as a conceptual tool to analyze these new policy making practices, Innes & Booher explore how what they call ‘authentic dialogue’ can be created. They show the changes required for this sort of collaborative policymaking endeavor. Interestingly, they do not take deadlock or conflict in the traditional policy system as their starting point, but public problems. The networks of players around such a problem are to be facilitated, in terms of staff and resources but also by developing mutual trust. So for instance, one of the reasons why collaborative dialogue was successful in the case of the conflict-ridden water issue was that the group could hire its own staff and consultants who were answerable only to them. Innes & Booher are well aware that collaborative dialogues are far from being the dominant approach to policy making and discuss the many obstacles to the successful employment of such practices. Yet at the same time they show that the influence of collaborative practice should be analyzed in a different way, not simply in terms of policy outcomes but in terms of restructuring the policy networks and its discourse, of the emergence of social capital and more emphatic relationships among participants, of collective learning, and of increased capacity for innovative system adaptation to changing circumstances.

In the second chapter Patsy Healey, Claudio de Magalhaes, Ali Madanipour and John Pendlebury discuss ‘institutional capacity building’ in the city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. More in particular they investigate the career of the ‘Grainger Town Partnership’, an unusual coalition of forces aiming to reconstruct and restore part of the old inner city. They show how the classical-modernist division of policy agenda’s into ‘sectoral’ concerns lacked flexibility and imagination to deal with inner city problems. Moreover, the policy networks that built up around these sectoralized policy agenda’s made it very hard to break out of the established policy regimes. They analyze policy action in terms of the knowledge resources, relational resources and mobilization capabilities that actors draw upon and generate. This allows, according to Healey and her collaborators, for a better understanding of the new practices. Interestingly, they explore ways to combine both discourse analysis and an institutionalist approach. By so doing they can identify to what extent the struggle for new forms of governance is ‘merely ripples on the surface of a settled modality of governance’ or unsettles a whole culture of governance relations.
The chapter is also effective in rebutting any naive suggestion that we ‘merely’ have to readjust to a ‘new reality’ in which government structures have made way for new flexible forms of governance. Instead, they show the tensions and conflicts generated by newer ‘networked’ forms of policy-making and political mobilization, and illustrate how more traditionally organized municipal institutions have to readjust. It emphasizes the gradual transformation that takes place, both in terms of new discourses as well as new ways of governing that is the result of such experiments.

In the third chapter, ‘Frame in the Fields: Policy Making and the Re-invention of Politics’, Maarten Hajer analyses the case of ‘nature development’ in the Netherlands. It shows the limited effectiveness of classical-modernist practices in which plans for nature conservation are first agreed upon nationally, assuming that they subsequently only have to be implemented locally. In analyzing the case Hajer shows that the emerging political conflict was not merely related to the intended change of policy but at least as much to the institutional way of conducting politics. For him, this suggests that the conventional way of approaching policy making should be reconsidered. In our age it often is policy making that really ignites people politically. In the face of the crisis of party politics he suggests that policy-making processes gain a new, and as yet unexamined meaning and importance. In the days of classical-modernist politics, politicians were recognizable, people knew where politics was conducted and by whom. In most cases people also knew what the key cleavages were, what they wanted to get from politics and who to approach or vote for. Yet in the network society this is no longer that obvious. People have much more erratic political preferences that they often become aware of only in concrete controversies; controversies, moreover, that often relate to particular policy initiatives. Given the fact that classical-modernist political institutions are, by themselves, not sufficiently powerful to achieve policy change, a new agenda emerges for policy analysis.

The case illustrates the limited effectiveness of classical-modernist political practices in dealing with the new fragmented and unanticipated political dynamics and documents the subsequent response from government. New ‘interactive’ policymaking practices were successful were traditional practices failed. Drawing on the analysis of this success Hajer identifies new tasks for a deliberative policy analysis. He suggests discourse analysis as a tool to help fulfil that promise.

The answer to political conflict and value pluralism in the fragmented institutional landscape
of the network society, as the authors in the first section argue, is some form of democratic political deliberation. The three papers in section two, *Rethinking Policy Discourse*, have as their common theme the obstacles that the real world of politics and administration present to such uncoerced and open deliberation and the political reflexivity this is supposed to promote. After all, as we argued earlier, what we have on our mind’s eye when we evoke democratic deliberation, is not some abstract, idealized theoretical construct, but real people and communities who struggle with concrete issues in settings that are rife with conflict and power differentials. In such settings attempts at deliberative problem-solving will be marred by inequalities in political information and access, by ingrained patterns of exclusion and marginalization, and particularly by insidious, unrecognized biases in policy rhetoric and perception. The bottom line is that open democratic deliberation and citizen engagement, while a promising and perhaps necessary road to take in the political-institutional landscape of the new modernity, will be constrained from all sides by the realities of power politics in the liberal constitutionalist state. The chapters in this section explore the nature and extent of these constraints.

Torgerson situates the constraining influence on democratic deliberation in the administrative-analytic complex that governs modern society. Public administration in advanced industrial society, he argues is above all characterized by a particular orientation (simplification of social and technical complexity and the employment of a value-neutral, technocratic language in the service of hierarchical control). In most societies the entrenched position of the political-administrative elite results in a hegemonic discourse about concrete policy issues, such as environmental pollution or spatial planning, that effectively marginalizes certain groups whose lives will be affected by the former’s decisions. In rare cases, enlightened administrators are able break through this discursive dominance with innovative experiments in inclusive discursive designs, but more often, even these attempts at open deliberation will result in cooptation and the stifling of alternative voices. On the basis of two cases in environmental politics, Torgerson argues for the opening up of the hegemonic space by the introduction of counter-cultural, ‘carnivalesque’ elements in the discourse, a theater of the absurd, that challenge the established dynamics of power, emphasize the ambivalences of concrete problem situations against the technocratic simplifications of administrators, and thus create reflective moments of policy discourse.

In addition to the constraining influence of the administrative-analytic complex, there is a more hidden obstacle to open, democratic deliberation that emanates from the taken-for-
granted ways of doing things in specific societal domains. Practices interconnect intuitions, understandings, commitments, and action into a meaningful, self-evident way of going about things in a particular domain. Both Wagenaar and Cook and Laws and Rein in their respective chapters show that such organized systems of action and belief powerfully shape actors understanding of complex social and technological situations to the extent that they form their own justification and drive other ways of doing or understanding outside the sphere of what is believed to be feasible or acceptable. Their foundation in the spontaneity of people’s everyday activities makes their constraining influence on open democratic deliberation particularly insidious as they, in Bourdieu’s felicitous phrase, “naturalize their own arbitrariness”. Bias underestates the effect of practices upon people’s understanding of the world; the term second nature would be more apposite. Practice theory goes beyond interpretation in that it stresses the sensefulness (over the more cerebral meaningfulness) of a situation. People who are engaged in a practice have assumed a particular social identity that they signal to their environment, and that validates what they do and say both to themselves and to the world at large.

The chapter of Wagenaar and Cook shows how practice has emerged over the last two decades as a key concept for a deliberative policy analysis. Outlining in an instructive way the variety of ways that scholars in philosophy and social theory have used the concept thus far, they employ it in their own case study. Practice, they argue, may be difficult to define, more a perspective than a concept, but in broad-brush strokes it can be seen as a patterned configuration of human activity that, in its execution shapes and defines preferences, meanings and solutions. Using the example of the political stalemate around the expansion of Schiphol airport near Amsterdam, they show that the practices of airport managers and employees literally create the categories of the public discourse concerning the airport, thereby introducing an powerful bias in the debate that consistently marginalizes citizens and groups worried about noise, safety, and pollution. Wagenaar and Cook then argue that, when properly understood, practices, instead of limiting the discourse, may function as units of reflexivity. To this end analysts and citizens must probe the problem ecology that prompted the practice, and the myriad of often arbitrary practical and moral choices, that constituted it in the first place. Similar to Torgerson they see the analyst’s task as revealing the hidden ambiguity and incertitude that is buried inside taken-for-granted policy practices and discourses, with the purpose of creating reflexive space. Practitioners, citizens, and administrators may in this way cooperate in a problem-oriented, bottom-up, empowered kind
of democratic deliberation on concrete issues. The chapter of Laws and Rein contains a further elaboration of the well-known concept of a policy frame. The frame-concept explains stubborn policy controversies by situating them in conflicting structures of value and belief that capture what is problematic and how to resolve the problematic situation. The chapter marks a shift in the study of frames away from framing as a strategic contest for resources towards a probing of the nature of frame shifts and the intellectual and institutional conditions of such reframing efforts. What makes frame resistant to change, the authors argue, is that they are rooted in action. This imbues them with a naturalness that resists reflection. In situations in which actors clash over conflicting understandings of a complex, uncertain situation, a frame will hold doubt at bay. But it is precisely this interplay of belief and doubt that contains the reflexive potential of frames. In an extended discussion of the problem of industrial waste disposal that was triggered by the notorious Love Canal scandal, the authors show both how the frames with which the various actors approach the problem are institutionalized in practices, and how by attempting to do things differently in the face of bitter conflict or obvious policy failure, opens up opportunities for constructive doubt and attempts at reframing the situation by finding resonances with wider “figures of argument” that are available in the public sphere.

The third section, Methods and Foundations of Deliberative Policy Analysis, contains three papers addressing the philosophical assumptions and professional implications of a post-empiricist, deliberative policy analysis. Their common theme is that one cannot understand the practical failings of traditional policy professionalism, nor formulate a viable alternative, without a firm grasp of the philosophical underpinnings of both approaches. Fischer’s contribution is a case in point. He begins his paper with the familiar observation that traditional policy science has failed to live up to its ambition: to contribute to an understanding, let alone amelioration, of the kind of wicked problems that confronts modern society. He argues that the cause of this failure resides in the misconceived epistemological and methodological nature of traditional policy science. Locked inside a positivist image of science, traditional policy analysis, he argues, has failed to understand the socially constructed, pragmatically driven nature of scientific knowledge production, a point that is picked up and extended by Gottweis in his chapter. The facts and concepts of policy analysis, both authors argue, are ‘inscribed’ upon the social and natural world through practices of scientific representation. Our grasp of the objects of policy analysis, these authors conclude,
rests on contextually situated, normatively-driven, practical reasoning. As Yanow puts it succinctly in her chapter, the understanding of public policy “requires local knowledge – the very mundane, but still expert understanding of, and practical reasoning about, local conditions derived from lived experience”. Policy objects, as these authors argue, are essentially contested. The representation of an issue (unemployment, global warming, genetic engineering, airport noise) is the issue.

The object of post-empiricist policy analysis (as Fischer calls it) is therefore not only fundamentally dispersed (No longer self-evidently located in the halls of government, but instead spread out over the communities of citizens, administrators, and executive agencies. As Gottweis calls it, governing is the resultant of a “regime of practices”)., but also recast (Policy analysis is, above all, concerned with the communicative, deliberative nature of political activity.). All three authors in this section, sketch the implications of these insights for the object and role of policy analysis. The objects of analysis, far from being unproblematic entities in the political landscape, are seen as the outcome of complex, socially patterned, processes of articulation by, and contestation between, shifting groups of actors. Policy analysis is in this sense fundamentally interpretative and reflexive. Yanow draws out what an interpretative approach implies for the role of the analyst. She demonstrates that interpretative analysis is just as systematic and methodical as traditional methods (‘interpretative is not impressionistic’, as she formulates it), and discusses at length the various methods that are available to the interpretative analyst. Gottweis explores the reflexive implications of post-empiricist policy analysis. Instead of assuming governability and policy making, the complex appreciations and political judgments that constitute it must itself be posed as a problem. Second, as both Fischer and Yanow explain, in the essentially discursive and fragmented field of policymaking, the role of the analyst is not to suggest effective or efficient solutions that bring political discussions to an end. Instead his role should be to facilitate the citizen’s and client’s capacity for democratic deliberation and collective learning: about value and preferences, about assumptions of self and others, about mutual dependencies and power differentials, about opportunities and constraints, about the desirability of solutions and outcomes, in sum, about what it means to be an engaged citizen. In this way, these three authors, in conjunction with the other contributors to this book, give new meaning to Harold Lasswell’s ideal of a ‘policy science of democracy’.